Interwoven Models of Peacemaking – the Israeli-Palestinian Case and Beyond

Abstract

ABSTRACTTwo competitive approaches are dominant in the debate about the optimal strategy to cope with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Conflict-Management and Conflict-Resolution. This paper suggests looking at them as complementary. It presents four models of peacemaking. The first, the Strong Leader Model, involves drastic unilateral initiatives taken by one of the parties. The second, the Social Reformer Model, encourages domestic reforms within each of the parties. The third, the Political Elite Model, offers various forms of diplomatic interactions and is the dominant experience in Middle East peace processes. The fourth, the Public Assembly Model, proposes the creation of a major Israeli-Palestinian Public Negotiating Congress, based on the multiparty talks used in South Africa and Northern Ireland during the 1990s. This paper concludes that a multifaceted approach, which uses insights from all models in an integrated fashion, has the potential to create a momentum for a revolutionary peacemaking process. AcknowledgmentThe author is grateful to Gloria Morgenstern and Israel Cohen for reviewing and editing the paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. For a further discussion on the classical symptoms of intractable conflict, see, for example, Louis Kriesberg ‘Intractable conflicts’, Peace Review, 5/4 (1993), 417–21; Daniel Bar-Tal, ‘Societal beliefs in times of intractable conflict: The Israeli case’, International Journal of Conflict Management, 9/1 (1998), 22–50; Peter Coleman, ‘Intractable Conflict’, in Morton Deutsch and Peter Coleman, eds., The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (San Francisco, CA, 2000), 428–50; Herbert Kelman, ‘Social-psychological dimensions of international conflict’ in William. Zartman, ed., Peacemaking in international conflict: Methods & techniques (rev. ed.) (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007a), 61–107.2. Ian Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab Israeli Conflict, fifth edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2007)3. ‘Revolution’ as Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy has written, ‘brings on the speaking of new, unheard of language, another logic, a revaluation of all values’. (Friedrich, Carl J. (ed.), Revolution (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. 4). The need for a different approach to peacemaking is a lesson that can be learned from the peacemaking processes of the 1990s that led to a revolutionary transformation in two other cases of intractable conflict: the struggle against the Apartheid system in South Africa and The Troubles in Northern Ireland. See Allister Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Negotiated Revolution (Sandton, South Africa: Struik Book Distributors, 1994) and George Mitchell, Making Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).4. Friedrich Hayek, 1967, Studies in Philosophy: Politics and Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 22–425. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘Dialectic between Conflict-Management and Conflict-Resolution’, in Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, ed., The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).6. Efraim Inbar, ‘Israel’s Palestinian Challenge’, Israel Affairs, 12/4 (2006), 823–42; Simha Landau, ‘Settings, Factors and Phenomena of Conflict in Israeli Society’, in Hans-Jörg, Albrecht, Ernesto Kiza, Hassan Rezaei, Holger-C. Rohne, Jan-Michael Simon, eds, Conflicts and Conflict Resolution in Middle Eastern Societies – Between Tradition and Modernity (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 2006), 257–74.7. Herbert Kelman, ‘The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Its Vicissitudes: Insights from Attitude Theory’, American Psychologist, 63/4 (2007b), 287–303.8. Herbert Kelman, ‘Negotiation as interactive problem solving’, International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice, 1/1 (1996), 99–123.9. Micah Goodman, Catch-67: The Left, the Right, and the Legacy of the Six-Day War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018).10. Kelman, ‘Negotiation as interactive problem solving’, 99–123.11. In the framework of this paper, negotiation is a key concept to understand the difference between conflict-resolution and conflict-management. The conflict-resolution approach offers various channels and strategies to negotiate solutions to the conflict. The conflict-management approach suggests other methods to cope with the conflict. It offers alternative methods to negotiation.12. Social scientists have pointed out that in situations of civil war, a clear victory of one side, under certain circumstances, can bring stability. See Monica Duffy Toft, ‘Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?’, International Security, 34/4 (2010), 7–36. In the Israeli-Palestinian situation, the consensus solution is a ‘two state solution’. Moreover, the assumption of this paper is that a clear victory of one side, which can lead to peace and stability, is not a viable option. The four models of this paper emerge from the ongoing debate among scholars and practitioners – conflict-management versus conflict-resolution.13. Bakiner emphasises the need for a multidimensional peacemaking process to cope with intrastate conflicts. He argues that a multidimensional peacemaking process in Colombia – which involved leaders, people and foreign governments – led to a peace pact in 2016. In contrast, a one-dimensional peacemaking process in Turkey – which involved only political elites – failed. See Onur Bakiner, ‘Why Do Peace Negotiations Succeed or Fail? Legal Commitment, Transparency, and Inclusion during Peace Negotiations in Colombia (2012–2016) and Turkey (2012–2015)’, Negotiation Journal, 35/4 (2019), 471–513.14. The Strong Leader could be regarded as a metaphor. For example, it could be an international or regional power that leads a drastic move to shape the geopolitical structure of the conflict.15. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince in Peter Bondanella & Mark Musa, eds., The Portable Machiavelli (Penguin Classics, 1979).16. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).17. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).18. Extracts from an interview with Friedrich von Hayek, Interviews in El Mercurio (Santiago, Chile, 1981) from: https://puntodevistaeconomico.com/2016/12/21/extracts-from-an-interview-with-friedrich-von-hayek-el-mercurio-chile-1981/19. Leonard Wantchekon, ‘The Paradox of “Warlord” Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation’, The American Political Science Review, 98/1 (2004), 17–33.20. https://puntodevistaeconomico.com/2016/12/21/extracts-from-an-interview-with-friedrich-von-hayek-el-mercurio-chile-1981/21. See, for example, Ignazio Silone, The School for Dictators (New York & London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1938).22. For further discussion on the republic interpretation of The Prince, see Sapir Handelman, ‘Between The Prince and The Road to Serfdom: Two Political Pamphlets that Challenged the Conventional Wisdom of their Times’, Divination 28 (2008), 102–03 and Leo Strauss, An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 44–47.23. Kelman, ‘The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Its Vicissitudes: Insights from Attitude Theory’, 287–303.24. David Hirst & Irene Beeson, Sadat (London: Faber & Faber, 1981), 252–54.25. Bickerton and Klausner claim that internal affairs of Egypt were a driver for peace. The potential of getting resources – which could enable Egypt to reconstruct the Suez Canal and free Egypt from Soviet control – motivated Sadat to come to peace with Israel. Moreover, according to this analysis, Begin assumed that Sadat was so eager to secure Egyptian control over the Sinai Peninsula that he would overlook the demands of Palestinians for an independent state. See Bickerton & Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab Israeli conflict, pp. 188 and 191.26. See Sadat’s speech in the Israeli parliament on November 20, 1977: https://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/doc/Speech_sadat_1977_eng.htm27. Herbert Kelman, ‘The Psychological Impact of the Sadat Visit on Israeli Society’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 11/2 (2005a), 111–36.28. Bickerton & Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab Israeli conflict, 190.29. Bickerton & Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab Israeli conflict, 194.30. Alastair Smith and Allan Stam, ‘Mediation and peacekeeping in a random walk model of civil and interstate war’, International Studies Review, 5/4 (2003), 115–135.31. Kelman, ‘The Psychological Impact of the Sadat Visit on Israeli Society’, 130–31.32. Eytan Gilboa, ‘Secret Diplomacy in the Television Age’, Gazette: The International Journal of Communication Studies, 60/3 (1998), 211–25.33. Kelman Herbert, ‘Some determinants of the Oslo breakthrough’,International Negotiation, 2/2 (1997), 183–194.34. Elie Podeh & Onn Winckler, Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004).35. Agassi pointed out that Pan-Arabism associates ethnic identity with nationalist identity. In contrast, political Islam associates religious identity with nationalist identity. See Joseph Agassi, Liberal Nationalism for Israel: Towards an Israeli National Identity (Jerusalem and New York: Gefen Pub. House, 1999).36. Sapir Handelman, ‘Peacemaking Contractualism: A Peacemaking Approach to Cope with Difficult Situations of Intractable Conflict’, Global Change, Peace & Security 28/1 (2016), 123–144.37. Herbert Kelman, ‘Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation: A Social-Psychological Perspective on Ending Violent Conflict Between Identity Groups’, Landscapes of Violence, 1/1 (2010), 1–9.38. See, for example: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-aug-23-fg-gaza23-story.html39. Bickerton & Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab Israeli conflict, p. 380.40. For a comprehensive historical and political account of Hamas, see Ziad Abu-Amr, ‘Hamas: A Historical and Political Background’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 22/4 (1993), 5–19.41. For example, Sharon lost in a Likud party referendum held in May 2004.42. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.43. Sapir Handelman, Conflict and Peacemaking in Israel-Palestine: Theory and Application (London & New York: Routledge, 2014), 33–34.44. James Buchanan, Moral Science and Moral Order, Vol. 17 of The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan (Indianapolis: Liberty fund, 2001).45. Sadat addressed this issue many times in his historical speech in the Israeli parliament. https://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/doc/Speech_sadat_1977_eng.htm46. Buchanan, Moral Science and Moral Order.47. Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960).48. Viktor Vanberg, ‘Market and State: The Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 1/1 (2005), 23–49.49. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. xix.50. The efforts to reconstruct Cambodia after the Genocide demonstrate the challenge of forming an effective post-conflict cooperation between local and international peacebuilders (Than, 1992). See Mya Than, ‘Rehabilitation and economic reconstruction in Cambodia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 14/3 (1992), 269–86. The social-reformer model of this paper indicates that domestic reforms in both the Palestinian and Israeli societies should be an integral part of the peacemaking effort. Building the foundations for order and stability is necessary for reaching a stable political settlement.51. See, for example: https://observer.com/2017/03/palestinian-conflict-israel-solution-greater-gaza/ As far as I know, there was not any official publication of the plan.52. ‘The Greater Gaza Plan’ is often referred as ‘the New State Solution’. See, for example: https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-the-new-state-solution-20190421-e5cynseo5zeelllo2rdopbkf6m-story.html ‘The Greater Gaza Plan’, as presented in the mass media, is a package deal. I suggest examining it as an opening position for negotiation.53. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.54. The democratic peace theory indicates that democratic states tend not to fight one another. See Donald Snow, Cases in International Relation, Fourth Edition (New York: Pearson – Longman, 2010), 7.55. Landau, ‘Settings, Factors and Phenomena of Conflict in Israeli Society’, 261–63.56. Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).57. In the words of Robert Frost: ‘Home is the place where, when you go there, they have to take you in. I should have called it something you haven’t to deserve’.https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44261/the-death-of-the-hired-man58. Agassi, Liberal Nationalism for Israel.59. Agassi’s apocalyptic vision brings to mind the last chapter of the conflict in Northern Ireland – ‘The Troubles’. See Paul Dixon, Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace (New York and Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 2.60. Smooha points out that there is an inherent contradiction between ‘Israel as a Jewish state’ and ‘Israel as a democratic state’. This contradiction cannot be resolved but it can be managed (Sammy Smooha, ‘Minority status in an ethnic democracy: The status of the Arab minority in Israel’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 13/3 (1990), 389–413). Agassi argues that the only way for Israel to become a normal republic is to create a liberal nationalism for the Israeli inhabitants – the ‘Israeli Nation’ (Agassi, Liberal Nationalism for Israel).61. Hussein Agha, Shai Feldman, Ahmad Khalidi, and Zeev Schiff, Track-II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 3.62. Gilboa, ‘Secret Diplomacy in the Television Age’.63. Agha et al., Track-II Diplomacy, 1–3.64. Gilboa, ’Secret Diplomacy in the Television Age’.65. Kelman, ’Some determinants of the Oslo breakthrough’.66. In the Oslo years, the political power and position of Abu Ala (Ahmed Qurei), a member of the Palestinian team, was marginal – ‘Any leaks of contacts between Ahmed Qurei and the Israeli side would have not been taken seriously by the majority within the Palestinian camp’ (Agha et al., Track-II Diplomacy, 38–39). Later, he became the Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority.67. ‘Working trust’ means, ‘a pragmatic trust in the other’s interest in achieving and maintaining peace’. See Herbert Kelman, ‘Building trust among enemies: The central challenge for international conflict resolution’, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 29/6 (2005b), pp. 639–650.68. Agha et al., Track-II Diplomacy, 41.69. Bickerton & Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab Israeli conflict, 256–58.70. https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20principles.aspx71. Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1998).72. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/framework_for_peace_in_the_middle_east73. Kelman, ‘Some determinants of the Oslo breakthrough’.74. Agha et al., Track-II Diplomacy, 3375. Bickerton & Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab Israeli conflict, 250–51.76. Agha et al., Track-II Diplomacy, p. 34; Bickerton & Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab Israeli conflict, 250.77. Agha et al., Track-II Diplomacy, 54.78. One of the symptoms of intractable conflict is the ‘paradox of violence’ – Progression of the peace process leads to a significant increase in the level of violence (Handelman, ‘Peacemaking Contractualism’, pp.128–129). In South Africa, for example, about 15,000 people died in political violence from 1984 until the early 1990s. More than half of them died during the negotiations on the transition of South Africa in the 1990s (Timothy Sisk, ‘South Africa’s National Peace Accord’, Peace and Change, 19/1 (1994), 52).79. In general, research indicates that public opinion has an important impact on policy makers. Leaders play a two-level game. They negotiate with the rival leadership and with their people (Robert Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization 42/3 (1988), 427–60). This phenomenon is more acute in situations of intractable conflict such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.80. Kelman, ‘The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Its Vicissitudes’, p.292.81. Sapir Handelman, Thought Manipulation: The Use and Abuse of Psychological Trickery (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2009), 83–99.82. Since the Second Intifada, scholars and practitioners began to shift their attention from the ‘conflict-resolution’ approach to the ‘conflict-management’ approach. See Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘Dialectic between Conflict-Management and Conflict-Resolution’ and Inbar, ‘Israel’s Palestinian Challenge’.83. Handelman, ‘Peacemaking Contractualism’, 126.84. Mitchell, Making Peace.85. Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country.86. Sapir Handelman, ‘The Minds of Peace Experiment: A laboratory for people-to-people diplomacy’, Israel Affairs 18/1 (2012), 1–11.87. The goal of the Minds of Peace organisation is to establish an Israeli-Palestinian Public Negotiating Congress with political power. The Israeli-Palestinian management of this NGO drafted a detailed program for nominating representatives to a legitimate congress. The program was presented in different forums. Here is a link to the website of the NGO: mindsofpeace.org88. For example, checkpoints in the West Bank are regarded by Israelis as a security instrument and by Palestinians as a tool of violence. See Handelman, ‘The Minds of Peace Experiment’, 4.89. In South Africa, leaders of the opposing sides negotiated and formulated conditions for participation in the multiparty talks. See Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another, 128–29.90. Senator George Mitchell, the independent chairman of the all-party talks in Northern Ireland, determined principles of democratic non-violent dialogue, known as the Mitchell Principles. Each representative had to commit to the Mitchell Principles (Mitchell, Making Peace).91. I have borrowed the term ‘competitive pluralism’ from Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).92. See, for example, Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson’s Law (London: John Murray, 1958).93. Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (vol. 2) (London: Routledge, 1945).94. Sapir Handelman, ‘The calculus of peace and conflict: a contractualist perspective’, International Journal of Conflict Management, 32/4 (2021), 673–96.95. Sapir Handelman argues that an equilibrium between ‘working trust’ among the negotiators and ‘institutional trust’ (public trust in the congress) is required for progress. This critical element is very difficult to achieve in situations of intractable conflict. For example, in the revolutionary peacemaking process in Northern Ireland during the 1990s, it took one year and a half to build trust. See Handelman, ‘The calculus of peace and conflict’ and Daniel Curran and James Sebenius, ‘The Mediator as Coalition-Builder: George Mitchell in Northern Ireland’, International Negotiation 8/1(2003), 111–47.96. Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country.97. Mitchell, Making Peace.98. William Zartman, ‘Negotiating the South African Conflict’, in William Zartman, ed., Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Internal Wars (Washington: Brookings, 1995), 147–74.99. quoted in Zartman, ‘Negotiating the South African Conflict’, 155.100. Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, 130.101. Jung Courtney, Ellen Lust-Okar, and Ian Shapiro, ‘Problems and Prospects for Democratic Settlements: South Africa as a Model for the Middle East and Northern Ireland?’, Politics and Society, 33(2005), 269–308.102. Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, p. 184.103. Leonard Thompson, A history of South Africa, Third Edition (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), 243.104. South African President P. W. Botha came to power in 1978. He initiated liberal reforms in the Apartheid system. However, he did not intend to end white domination. The reforms stimulated intensified demands from the black population for full democracy. The good intentions to establish a more liberal country led to violence and instability. Order was restored by military force. See Samuel. Huntington, ‘How Countries Democratize’, Political Science Quarterly, 106/4 (1992), pp.596–597.105. Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, 189–90.106. Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country, 194.107. Mitchell, Making Peace, 35–36.108. Mitchell, Making Peace, p. 126; David McKittrick and David McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles: The Story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland (Chicago: New Amsterdam Books, 2002).109. Mitchell, Making Peace, 117.110. Mitchell, Making Peace, 143–83.111. Curran and Sebenius, ‘The Mediator as Coalition-Builder’, 111-47.112. Ibid.113. Mitchel, Making Peace, 184.114. See, for example, Handelman, ‘The Minds of Peace Experiment’. Visit http://mindsofpeace.org/115. The initiative was covered by the Australian Public TV, SBS:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U4I7Jt9BCpg&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR0u3Nm2_fsAJbnZ3JQOlvWbBh6doCZOTJahrjKlFjH0_EST-an_ORp1sZQ116. Stephen Walt, ‘Revolution and War’, World Politics, 44/3 (1992), 321–68117. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994).118. In the Israeli-Palestinian case – as in the peacemaking processes in Northern Ireland and South Africa – the two sides will need the support of the international community. For example, there are major problems – such as the impact of international spoilers, security, and refugees – that the two sides will not be able to solve by themselves.119. Curran and Sebenius, ‘The Mediator as Coalition-Builder’.120. Handelman, ‘The calculus of peace and conflict’.Additional informationNotes on contributorsSapir HandelmanSapir Handelman received the 2010 Peter Becker Award for Peace and Conflict Research. Dr. Handelman was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Psychology Department of Harvard University, and he was the first scholar to receive the Lentz Fellowship in Peace Research three times in a row. Dr. Handelman is the Chairman of the Board of the Minds of Peace Organization, an NGO registered in the US and Israel. His latest joint initiative with NegoFlict is to create digital platforms for Brief Solution Focused Negotiation. He is an Associate Professor (Senior Lecturer) and the founder of the Conflict Studies Program at Achva Academic College, Israel.