‘Tired of Waking Up on the Floor’ the Temptations and Horror of Cold War Multilateral Diplomacy

Abstract

ABSTRACTFootnote1This article discusses non-conventional diplomatic tools. It does so by focussing on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Multilateral Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks and suggests that individuals and individual creativity to make use of non-conventional tools, in combination with attention to working conditions, impact the outcome. CSCE ventured in entirely new territory and promoted such novel concepts as the indivisibility of security, and the free flow of individuals, information, and ideas. As such it appealed to negotiatiors’ creativity; by contrast, MBFR was about reducing conventional forces in the given constellation of a divided Europe – it treated this division as a fact of life; as such it may have offered far less opportunities for individual diplomats’ creativity to fully blossom. Taken together a discussion of these tools also contribute to the structure – agency debate: they provide additional evidence that individual diplomats – though often simply seen as tools of their respective governments and merely acting within a certain constellation – and close attention to the conditions they have to work in, do matter, even when, of course, it is governments, not diplomats, that will have to sanction the results they achieve. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. The title ‘Tired of Waking Up on the Floor’ is taken from The No No Song, composed by David P. Jackson Jr and Hoyt Wayne Axton where the singer announces he will stop drinking and taking drugs because he’s ‘Tired of Waking Up on the Floor’. It was recorded in 1974 by Ringo Starr and released on his Goodnight Vienna. At the end of the song Starr murmurs he really needs another drink. Perhaps this is not the best place to thank the two anonymous reviewers of an earlier version of this article, but I’d like to express my gratitude for their valuable comments and suggestions.2. ‘Oh, When These Bloody Talks Are Over’ (to the melody of ‘Oh, What a Friend We Have in Jesus’) in Documents on British Policy Overseas, series III, vol. III (London: The Stationary Office, 1997), 479. This contribution is partly based on an earlier Dutch language piece I wrote. This earlier piece was called ‘After hours late in the bar. De verlokkingen en verschrikkingen van de multilaterale diplomatie’, and was published in a liber amicorum edited by Bob de Graaff and Duco Hellema: Instrumenten van buitenlandse politiek. Achtergronden en praktijk van de Nederlandse diplomatie (Instruments of Foreign Policy. Dutch Diplomacy’s Backgrounds and Practice) (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007), 114–22. The present text was thoroughly revised and substantially expanded.3. For other examples, see: Jennifer Mori, The Culture of Diplomacy: Britain in Europe, c. 1750–1830 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), and Brian Vick, The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2014). There is, of course, ample scholarship on rules, the diplomatic procedures, and the like, e.g., Brigid Starkey, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Mark A. Boyer, Negotiating a Complex World: An Introduction to International Negotiation 2nd edn. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005).4. Paul Meerts, ‘The changing nature of diplomatic negotiation’, in Jan Melissen, ed., Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 1999), 79–93, at 86. Cf. Raymond Cohen, International Politics: The Rules of the Game (London and New York : Longman, 1981).5. Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 84.6. Neumann, Diplomatic Sites.7. MBFR attracted limited scholarly interest in recent years. Exceptions include Lawrence Freedman, Arms Control Management or Reform (Abingdon, Ox.; Routledge & Keegan Paul Ltd, 2021).8. Martin D. Brown and Angela Romano, “Executors or Creative Deal-Makers?: The Role of the Diplomats in the Making of the Helsinki CSCE,” in Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder, eds., The CSCE and the End of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990 (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2019), 43–73; Roger Beetham, ‘Observations on British Diplomacy and the CSCE Process’, British Scholar III, no. 1 (September 2010): 127–38, at 132.9. This resulted in a PhD: Het heeft onze aandacht. Nederland en de rechten van de mens in Oost-Europa en Joegoslavië, 1972–1989 (Amsterdam: Boom, 2001), and a number of articles and book chapters, i.e., “The Netherlands and the Rank of Denmark,” in Carol Fink, Lubor Jilek and Antoine Fleury, eds., Human rights in Europe after 1945 – Les droits de l’Homme en Europe depuis 1945 (Berne: Peter Lang, 2003), 333–54; “Détente or human rights: the Netherlands and the Soviet Union,” in P.R. Baehr, M.C. Castermans and F. Grünfeld, Human rights in the foreign policy of the Netherlands (Antwerp, Oxford & New York: Intersentia, 2002), 123–48; “Tradition oder Kalkül. Die niederländische Menschenrechtspolitik mit Hinblick auf Jugoslawien,” in Jahrbuch Zentrum für Niederlande Studien 2002,13 (Münster: Zentrum für Niederlande Studien, 2003), 99–114; “`Im Osten nichts neues´. De veiligheidsdimensie van de CVSE in Nederlandse ogen“, Militaire Spectator 174, no. 3 (2005): 125–30; ‘It was Cold War and We Wanted to Win. Détente, Human Rights and the CSCE’, in Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny and Christian Nuenlist, eds., Origins of the European Security System. The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75 (London: Routledge, 2008), 183–98; “`That Poland be Polish again’? Dutch policy on Poland, 1975–1979,” in D.A. Hellema, R. Zelichowski and A.C. van der Zwan (ed.), Poland and the Netherlands. A case study of European relations (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 2011), 185–210. “NATO needs more than planes and tanks and guns,” in P.A.L. Ducheine and F.P.B. Osinga (ed.), Winning without killing: the strategic and operational utility of non-kinetic capabilities in crises. NL ARMS 2017 (The Hague 2017), 55–66.10. Documents on British Policy Overseas, series III, volume III (London: The Stationary Office 1997); Alice Němcová, ed., CSCE Testimonies. Causes and Consequences of the Helsinki Final Act 1972–1989 (Prague: OSCE, 2013), and the site of the American Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (https://adst.org), among others.11. Mick Jagger and Keith Richard, “Sing This All Together,” from the Rolling Stones’ 1967 LP Their Satanic Majesties Request.12. Much has been written about CSCE; recent literature includes Michael Cotey Morgan, The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018); Poul Villaume and Odd Arme Westad, eds., Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War 1965–1985 (Copenhagen 2010); Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder ed., The CSCE and the End of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990 (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2019); Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny and Christian Nuenlist, eds., Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75 (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart eds., Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008).13. On Dean: Hans-Günther Brauch and Teri Grimwood, eds., Jonathan Dean. Pioneer in Détente in Europe, global cooperative security, arms control and disarmament (Cham: Springer, 2014).14. Sir Clive Rose, letter to the editor as quoted in Documents on British Policy Overseas, series III, volume III (London: The Stationary Office 1997), 479.15. Clive Rose to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 4 July 1974, in Documents on British Policy Overseas, series III, volume III (London: The Stationary Office 1997).16. Alisher Faizullaev, ‘Diplomatic Interactions and Negotiations’, in Negotiation Journal 30, no. 3 (2014), 275–299, at 286; Bradford D. Johnston, ‘Ronald Reagan’s Race to Space: American Atomic Diplomacy and SDI in the Age of Reykjavik’ (PhD dissertation, University of California, Merced, 2013), 55; Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost; At the Center of Decision (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 366–369.17. John Lennon, “Mind games,” taken from his 1973 LP of the same name.18. Albania refused the invitation, while Andorra’s foreign policy is conducted by France. Another micro-state, Monaco, did not participate in MPT but requested to be invited for the formal conference opening at Helsinki in July 1973.19. Alice Němcová, ed., CSCE Testimonies. Causes and Consequences of the Helsinki Final Act 1972–1989 (Prague: OSCE, 2013), 16.20. John J. Maresca, To Helsinki. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973–1975 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 7.21. This translates as: ‘PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRE-NON-MATTER. | The distinguished delegates came | and brought baskets, | they opened shutters, | they set doors ajar, | they presented specifications | they presented addenda | and corrections. | They gave them headers | they presented pre-drafts | and non-papers | for a long time they circulated | non-texts of non-documents. | In a solemn voice they discussed | in their clandestine mini-group | almost surreal and supernatural | distinguished, eminent, immortal | and astray among them | I suddenly buried | my face in my hands … | and I started to cry’. Helsinki to The Hague, 15 March 1973 in: Archives of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, Directorate of Atlantic Cooperation and Security, 1965–1974, inv.nr. 701.22. Hella Pick, Invisible Walls: A Journalist in Search of Her Life (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2021).23. See Thomas Fischer, Neutral Power in the CSCE: The N+N States and the Making of the Helsinki Accords 1975 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009); Thomas Fischer, Juhana Aunesluoma, and Aryo Makko, ‘Introduction: Neutrality and Nonalignment in World Politics during the Cold War’, Journal of Cold War Studies 18, no. 4 (2016): 4–11.24. Deep Purple, ‘Smoke On The Water’ from their 1972 LP Machine Head. Technically, the song was about the 1971 fire in the Montreux casino, not about Geneva.25. The considerations in this paragraph and in the next are derived from various interviews I conducted with erstwhile Dutch politicians, civil servants and negotiators during research for my PhD in the 1999–2000 period. These include Foreign Ministers Norbert Schmelzer (1971–1973) and Max van der Stoel (1973–1977; 1981–1982), Ministry of Foreign Affairs Political Director Charles Rutten (1974–1980), consecutive heads of the Atlantic Cooperation and Security Directorate, Van der Valk (1970–1974) and Willem van Eekelen (1974–1977), and Niek Biegman (1972–1977), the head of the Political NATO Affairs Desk; CSCE Geneva chief negotiators Reinier Huydecoper van Nigtevecht (1973–1974) and Joop van der Valk (1974–1975), and Basket I negotiator Godert de Vos van Steenwijk (1973–1975).26. On contemporary Dutch ideas on the Scandinavian countries, see Floribert Baudet, “The Netherlands and the Rank of Denmark,” in Carol Fink, Lubor Jilek and Antoine Fleury, eds., Human rights in Europe after 1945 – Les droits de l’Homme en Europe depuis 1945 (Berne: Peter Lang, 2003), 333–354. See also, on the topic of Dutch interest and actions in the field of human rights, Jan Eckel, Die Ambivalenz des Guten. Menschenrechte in der internationalen Politik seit den 1940ern (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014), 440–62.27. Maresca, To Helsinki, 14.28. See fn 25 supra.29. CSCE Testimonies, 103.30. This ties in with observations by Martin Brown and Angela Romano, and Stephan Kieninger that highlight the ‘non-traditional’ background of several key negotiators, see Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder, eds., The CSCE and the End of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990 (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2019), 352.31. Godert de Vos van Steenwijk, personal communication to author, 20 April, 2000. Huydecoper himself readily admitted he was ‘not a friend’ of the Soviet Union, but vehemently objected to the description by his former colleagues. Personal communication, 18 February, 2000.32. Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 84.33. Floribert Baudet, Het heeft onze aandacht. Nederland en de rechten van de mens in Oost-Europa en Joegoslavië, 1972–1989 (Amsterdam: Boom, 2001), 67–92.34. Parallel History Project, oral history session, Zürich, 10 September 2005. Participants included ambassadors Jacques Andréani (France), John Maresca (USA), Édouard Brunner (Switzerland), Sir Crispin Tickell (UK), Yuri Kashlev (USSR), Nicolae Ecobescu (Romania), Siegfried Bock (GDR), and Hans-Jörg Renk (Switzerland).35. (accessed March 23, 2022). https://adst.org/2016/12/basketball-fifth-basket-helsinki-final-act/.36. (accessed 23 March 2022) https://adst.org/2016/12/basketball-fifth-basket-helsinki-final-act/.37. Maresca, To Helsinki, 53.38. This was proposal CSCE/II/A/8, files 3 October 1973, which read ‘The participating States recognize the inalienable right of every people, freely and with all due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to choose, develop, adapt or change its political, economic, social or cultural system, without interference of any kind on the part of any State or group of states’, as reprinted in Igor I. Kavass, Jacqueline P. Granier and Mary F. Dominick, eds., Human rights, European politics, and the Helsinki accord: the documentary evolution of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1973–1975 volume III (Buffalo, NY: Hein, 1981), 121–22; Godert de Vos van Steenwijk, personal communication to author, 20 April, 2000.39. George Harrison, “Sue Me Sue You Blues,” taken from his 1973 LP Living in the Material World.40. Geneva (CSCE) to The Hague, 1 April 1975, Archives of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, Directorate of Atlantic Cooperation and Security, 1975–1984, inventory 1353, cf. cables Geneva (CSCE) to The Hague, 24 January 1975, The Hague to Geneva (CSCE), 28 January 1975, and Geneva (CSCE) to The Hague, 5 February 1975 in ibid. On coffee breaks, see also Maresca, To Helsinki, 48.41. John J. Maresca, communication Zürich, 10 September, 2005. There is nothing to this effect in his To Helsinki, that concentrates on the diplomatic exchanges that produced the Final Act.42. Petri Häkkäräinen, A state of peace in Europe: West Germany and the CSCE, 1966–1975 (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011).43. Marie-Pierre Rey, La Tentation du Rapprochement, France et URSS à l’Heure de la Détente, 1964–1974 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991); Marie-Pierre Rey, ‘France and the German Question in the Context of Ostpolitik and the CSCE, 1969–1974’, in Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart, eds., Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), 53–66.44. The Dutch had quite consistently tried to slow down the pace of negotiations, starting in November 1972; Floribert Baudet, ‘It was Cold War and We Wanted to Win. Détente, Human Rights and the CSCE’, in Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny and Christian Nuenlist, eds., Origins of the European Security System. The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75, (London: Routledge, 2008), 183–198; For a general discussion on the impact of smaller powers in Europe during the Cold War: Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson eds., Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The Influence of Smaller Powers (London: Routledge, 2019). Cf. interview with ambassador Jacques Andréani, in CSCE Testimonies (Prague OCSE 2013) 71–88, at 71.45. The Belgian delegation, for instance, was generally given little leeway. Richard Smith ed., Preparing for Helsinki: the CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2020), 52.46. [Roy Reeve], CSCE Ultimate Act [1975], available through the author of this article.47. Floribert Baudet, “It was Cold War and We Wanted to Win. Détente, Human Rights and the CSCE,” in Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny and Christian Nuenlist, eds., Origins of the European Security System. The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75, (London: Routledge, 2008), 183–98;48. Iver Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry (Ithaca, Harvard University Press, 2012), 16.49. ‘The Negotiators’ (to the melody of ‘The Wiffenpoof Song’), MBFR songbook, Documents on British Policy Overseas, series III, vol. III (London: The Stationary Office 1997), 479–80.Additional informationNotes on contributorsFloribert BaudetFloribert Baudet (1971) is associate professor of Strategy at the Faculty of Military Sciences and professor of Military History at the University of Amsterdam.