Conditional restraint: Why the India-Pakistan Kargil War is not a case of nuclear deterrence

IF 1.9 4区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Pub Date : 2023-11-02 DOI:10.1080/00963402.2023.2266943
Arzan Tarapore
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Abstract

ABSTRACTIn the 1999 Kargil War, India defended its territory from a Pakistani incursion but—in a departure from its historical behavior and standing war plans—chose not to expand the war with counter-attacks into Pakistan. Many observers attribute this restraint to nuclear deterrence, since India and Pakistan had become declared nuclear powers just a year earlier. In fact, India’s restraint was rooted not in deterrence, but specific strategic conditions. Those conditions no longer apply—and in a future conflict India may be encouraged to take especially risky and escalatory wartime action, which would pose an unprecedented test for nuclear deterrence.KEYWORDS: IndiaKargil WarPakistannuclear weapons AcknowledgmentsThe author wishes to thank Paul Kapur for helpful comments on an earlier draft.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).FundingThis article is based on research funded by the Stanton Foundation and administered through the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.FundingThis article is based on research funded by the Stanton Foundation and administered through the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.Additional informationFundingThis article is based on research funded by the Stanton Foundation and administered through the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.Notes on contributorsArzan TaraporeArzan Tarapore is a research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, where his research focuses on Indian military strategy and Indo-Pacific regional security. He is completing a book manuscript on the factors that shape Indian wartime strategy. He previously served in the Australian Defence Department.
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有条件的克制:为什么印巴卡吉尔战争不是核威慑的案例
在1999年的卡吉尔战争中,印度在巴基斯坦的入侵下保卫了自己的领土,但背离了其历史行为和一贯的战争计划,没有选择将战争扩大到巴基斯坦境内进行反击。许多观察家将这种克制归因于核威慑,因为印度和巴基斯坦在一年前才宣布成为核大国。事实上,印度的克制并非出于威慑,而是出于特定的战略条件。这些条件不再适用,在未来的冲突中,印度可能会被鼓励采取特别冒险和升级的战时行动,这将对核威慑构成前所未有的考验。作者希望感谢Paul Kapur对早期草稿的有益评论。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。本文基于斯坦福基金会资助并由斯坦福大学国际安全与合作中心管理的研究。本文基于斯坦福基金会资助并由斯坦福大学国际安全与合作中心管理的研究。本文基于斯坦福基金会资助并由斯坦福大学国际安全与合作中心管理的研究。作者简介arzan Tarapore是斯坦福大学国际安全与合作中心的研究学者,他的研究重点是印度军事战略和印太地区安全。他正在完成一本关于影响印度战时战略的因素的书的手稿。他之前曾在澳大利亚国防部任职。
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54
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