Minimalism's continued creep: Subject matter

Abstract

Abstract The problem of creeping minimalism is the problem of drawing a principled distinction between expressivists and non‐expressivists. Explanationism is a popular strategy for solving the problem, but two of its forms—ontological explanationism and representational explanationism—have fatal problems. Christine Tiefensee and Matthew Simpson have recently, and independently, endorsed a third form: subject matter explanationism. But this form also fails. At bottom, the problem is that it does not note the existence of non‐reductive expressivist views, just as earlier forms of explanationism did not note the existence of error theories, or non‐naturalist realists, or realists who wanted to endorse deflationary views of truth and representation. The failure of this latest version of explanationism—one that does indeed avoid problems with earlier versions—strengthens the case that we may not actually want a solution to the problem of creeping minimalism after all. Rather, a form of global expressivism—neopragmatism—might be regarded as yielding a version of non‐naturalist normative realism.