Other Oriented Hermeneutical Injustice, Affected Ignorance, or Human Ignorance?

Abstract

ABSTRACTPaul-Mikhail Podosky introduces the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice and argues that non-human animals are often the subjects of such injustice. In this paper, I argue that although the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice is coherent, Podosky’s examples – including his primary case of non-human animals – are not instances of it. I attempt to show that an epistemology of ignorance serves as a better theoretical basis for Podosky’s argument. In the final section of the paper, I discuss a case that, at first glance, seems to be one of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice. However, I argue that ultimately an epistemology of ignorance gives us a better account of the case.KEYWORDS: Epistemic injusticehermeneutical injusticeepistemology of ignorancenon-human animals Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Correction StatementThis article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.Notes1. As Medina notes, Fricker acknowledges performatively-based epistemic injustices in (Citation2007, 160).2. Lopez (Citationforthcoming) argues that although non-human animals cannot be the subjects of testimonial or hermeneutical injustice, they can be the subjects of another kind of epistemic injustice. Lopez focuses on skill or ‘know-how’ knowledge, which both human and non-human animals possess. Non-human animals have interests in acquiring true beliefs about their environment, other members of their species, etc., and when this acquisition is disrupted, they can suffer from epistemic injustice. Lopez argues that this kind of epistemic injustice does not require that one must be invested in being recognized as a knower. Thus the harm here will be decidedly different from that Fricker discusses.3. Since I am attempting to determine whether Fricker’s notion of hermeneutical injustice can be expanded to include other-oriented hermeneutical injustice, I use Fricker’s account of what it means to be harmed in one’s capacity as a knower. But see Lopez (Citationforthcoming) for an argument that there are kinds of epistemic injustice that do not require that one be invested in being recognized as a knower. Importantly, hermeneutical injustice is not one of them.4. Mills notes that white ignorance is not confined to whites. See (Citation2007, 22ff).5. There are connections between white ignorance and testimonial injustice, too. Testimonial injustices can be the result of the biases and misunderstandings that are endemic to white ignorance.6. The case is based on Enduring Love, a novel by Ian McEwen.7. In Fricker (Citation2016), Fricker discusses the differences between white ignorance and hermeneutical injustice. She argues that there are two primary differences: (1) white ignorance is usually epistemically culpable but hermeneutical injustice is not; (2) white ignorance does not generally involve a lack of concepts, but hermeneutical injustice always does. I think the epistemic culpability claim can be challenged if one thinks of white ignorance as systemic, group-based epistemic failures. Granted, some of the literature on white ignorance treats it as willful ignorance on the part of individuals. See Martin (Citation2021) for discussion.8. I have simplified Podosky’s account somewhat here. He invokes the notion of a schema. Schemas are ‘psychological structures that enable social agents to organize and respond to information efficiently’ (Podosky Citation2018, 220). Publicly shared meanings are schemas. They are internalized and serve as a basis for social beings to communicate with one another.9. I omit here the prescription of prejudicial testimonial judgments, for obvious reasons.10. Note that Ben Carson is Black. Mills is clear that the ‘white’ in ‘white ignorance’ is not confined to white people. See Mills (Citation2007).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by a Faculty Research Fellowship funded by Eastern Michigan University.Notes on contributorsJ. M. DieterleJ. M. Dieterle is a Professor of Philosophy at Eastern Michigan University. She is a Faculty Affiliate in the Environmental Science and Society program and the Critical Disabilities program. Her primary area of research is food ethics/food justice.