Conflict of interests driven by pharmaceutical incentivisation: risks to the medical fraternity in Pakistan

None Muhammad Naveed Noor, None Afifah Rahman-Shepherd, None Amna Rehana Siddiqui
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Abstract

Conflict of interest (COI) in medical practice, and how it affects healthcare delivery and quality, is a poorly studied issue in Pakistan. COI can broadly be defined as a situation that arises when the opportunity for personal gain takes primacy over an individual’s professional responsibilities.1 In medicine, trust is the cornerstone of the doctor-patient relationship. Doctors hold an authoritative position based on their knowledge and expertise and are entrusted by the healthcare system and patients to put the patients’ best interests first. This means that to maintain trust, not only doctors are required to appropriately diagnose, treat and/or manage patients’ illnesses, but also consider their social and financial circumstances. In this editorial, we draw attention to a prime example of how COI manifests in medical practice as a result of the interactions between doctors and pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs). While PSRs are a source of knowledge on existing and new pharmaceutical products, this relationship can turn into an apparatus of financial corruption, when, in their efforts to maximise profits, PSRs incentivise doctors for prescribing. We refer to this as incentive-linked prescribing (ILP) whereby doctors accept some form of incentive in exchange for prescribing to meet pharmaceutical sales targets, without considering the added financial burden on patients and adverse health outcomes. In 2021, the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan (DRAP) published rules by which pharmaceutical companies are prohibited to offer incentives to doctors for prescriptions, however, these rules are poorly enforced.2 The absence of concrete legislation, clear-cut guidelines, sound monitoring, and regulation mechanism paves the way for the establishment of the unethical profit-driven relationship between doctors and the pharmaceutical industry. Consequences of ILP to patients, doctors, and the healthcare system There is growing attention to ILP and its consequences to medical practice and public health in Pakistan. Research has shed light on the well-entrenched influence of PSRs on physicians prescribing practices.3 This level of influence is achieved with the help of incentives, which foster dependent relationships between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry. Alarmingly, much of the research concludes that ILP has become normalised within the medical fraternity and how they interact with pharmaceutical companies.3,4 ILP can lead to several negative consequences for patients, doctors, and the healthcare system, and it is critical that doctors are made aware of these consequences. Patients may be aware of the unethical profit-driven relationship between doctors and pharmaceutical companies, and for this reason, lose trust in doctors. Doctors may prescribe most costly and/or unnecessary medications than what would otherwise have been prescribed. This can put patients under additional financial pressure and subject them to potential adverse health outcomes. Indeed, ILP is one of the largest contributors to the consumption of antibiotics in Pakistan, in addition to over-the-counter medications.5 The abuse and misuse of antibiotics is the leading reason for antimicrobial resistance (AMR) worldwide, which is one of the top ten threats to global health and is estimated to cause ten million deaths each year by 2030.6 These consequences have significant negative implications for the healthcare system, in terms of burden of disease, financing, and quality of care provided. Continued.....
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医药激励驱动的利益冲突:巴基斯坦医学界的风险
在巴基斯坦,医疗实践中的利益冲突(COI)及其如何影响医疗服务和质量是一个研究较少的问题。COI可以广义地定义为当个人利益的机会优先于个人的职业责任时出现的情况在医学上,信任是医患关系的基石。医生基于他们的知识和专业知识拥有权威地位,并且受医疗保健系统和患者的委托,将患者的最大利益放在第一位。这意味着,为了保持信任,医生不仅需要适当地诊断、治疗和/或管理病人的疾病,还需要考虑他们的社会和经济状况。在这篇社论中,我们提请注意COI如何在医疗实践中表现为医生和药品销售代表(PSRs)之间的相互作用的一个主要例子。虽然公共服务提供者是现有和新药品的知识来源,但当公共服务提供者在努力实现利润最大化的过程中,鼓励医生开处方时,这种关系可能会变成一种金融腐败机制。我们将这种情况称为激励联系处方(ILP),即医生接受某种形式的激励,以换取处方以达到药品销售目标,而不考虑对患者增加的经济负担和不利的健康结果。2021年,巴基斯坦药品管理局(DRAP)公布了禁止制药公司向医生提供处方奖励的规定,然而,这些规定执行不力缺乏具体的立法、明确的指导方针、健全的监督和监管机制,为医生和制药行业之间不道德的利益驱动关系的建立铺平了道路。ILP对患者、医生和医疗保健系统的影响在巴基斯坦,ILP及其对医疗实践和公共卫生的影响越来越受到关注。研究揭示了PSRs对医生处方实践根深蒂固的影响这种程度的影响是在激励措施的帮助下实现的,这种激励措施促进了医生与制药行业之间的依赖关系。令人担忧的是,许多研究得出的结论是,ILP在医学界以及他们与制药公司的互动方式中已经成为常态。3,4 ILP会给病人、医生和医疗保健系统带来一些负面后果,让医生意识到这些后果是至关重要的。患者可能会意识到医生和制药公司之间不道德的利益驱动关系,并因此失去对医生的信任。医生可能会开出最昂贵和/或不必要的药物,而不是处方。这可能使患者承受额外的经济压力,并使他们遭受潜在的不良健康后果。事实上,除了非处方药物外,ILP是巴基斯坦抗生素消费的最大贡献者之一抗生素的滥用和误用是全世界抗菌素耐药性(AMR)的主要原因,是全球健康的十大威胁之一,估计到2030年每年将导致1000万人死亡。这些后果在疾病负担、资金和提供的护理质量方面对卫生保健系统产生重大负面影响。继续……
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