Analysis of strategic customer behavior in observable M/G/ 1 queues with impatience

IF 2.3 2区 工程技术 Q3 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL Quality Technology and Quantitative Management Pub Date : 2023-09-20 DOI:10.1080/16843703.2023.2257998
Jingchuan Zhang, Zaiming Liu, Gang Chen
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Furthermore, some representative numerical experiments are performed to visualize the theoretical results. The numerical scenarios illustrate the influence of the relative tolerance time on equilibrium strategy and socially optimal strategy. Finally, we compare the effect of relative tolerance time on social welfare in observable and unobservable queues. The numerical results show that observable queues lead to higher social welfare. This study provides guidance for system providers in designing more economical and sustainable public service systems.KEYWORDS: Observable M/G/1 queueimpatienceequilibrium strategiessocial welfare AcknowledgementsThe authors would like to thank the editor and two reviewers for their constructive and insightful comments and suggestions, which significantly improved the presentation and quality of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThis work is partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (72201072, 12071487), Guangdong Provincial Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project (GD23XGL072), Scientific Research Fund of Zhejiang Provincial Education Department and Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation (2022B1515120060).Notes on contributorsJingchuan ZhangJingchuan Zhang is currently an assistant professor in Alibaba Business School, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou, China. 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Abstract

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we propose a queueing-game-theoretic model and analyze the strategic behavior of customers and social optimization in an observable M/G/1 queue, in which arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk based on a new binary and random reward-cost structure. Each incoming customer to the queue has a relative tolerance time. If the customer’s service does not begin (or end) within his or her relative tolerance time, the customer will incur a cost for his or her waiting. We first derive closed-form solutions for customers’ equilibrium and socially optimal joining strategies using the technique of the Laplace-Stieltjes transform. Furthermore, some representative numerical experiments are performed to visualize the theoretical results. The numerical scenarios illustrate the influence of the relative tolerance time on equilibrium strategy and socially optimal strategy. Finally, we compare the effect of relative tolerance time on social welfare in observable and unobservable queues. The numerical results show that observable queues lead to higher social welfare. This study provides guidance for system providers in designing more economical and sustainable public service systems.KEYWORDS: Observable M/G/1 queueimpatienceequilibrium strategiessocial welfare AcknowledgementsThe authors would like to thank the editor and two reviewers for their constructive and insightful comments and suggestions, which significantly improved the presentation and quality of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThis work is partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (72201072, 12071487), Guangdong Provincial Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project (GD23XGL072), Scientific Research Fund of Zhejiang Provincial Education Department and Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation (2022B1515120060).Notes on contributorsJingchuan ZhangJingchuan Zhang is currently an assistant professor in Alibaba Business School, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou, China. She received the Ph.D. degree in Mathematics from Central South University, Changsha, China, in 2022. She studied as a visiting Ph.D. candidate in McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, Washington DC, the United States, from September 2019 to September 2020. Her main scientific interests include operations research, stochastic process, queueing theory, queueing games, and mathematical modeling. She has published several papers in international professional journals such as RAIRO-Operations Research, Operations Research Letters, Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization, etc.Zaiming LiuZaiming Liu is a professor in the School of Mathematics and Statistics, Central South University, Changsha, China. He received the Ph.D. degree in Mathematics from Central South University, Changsha, China, in 1988. He has published three books as a co-author and over 100 research papers in a variety of journals, such as Applied Mathematics Letters, Applied Mathematics and Computation, Applied Mathematical Modelling, Computers & Operations Research, Computers & Mathematics with Applications, Annals of Operations Research, and Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications. His main research interests focus on Markovian processes and their application, queueing theory, and stochastic models.Gang ChenGang Chen is an associate professor in the School of Management, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou, China. He worked as a postdoctoral in the School of Business, Sun Yat-Sen University during 2019–2022, He received the Master degree and the Ph.D. degree in Mathematics both from Central South University, Changsha, China, in 2016 and 2019, respectively. His current research interests focus on stochastic models, sensitivity-based optimization, Markov decision processes, and queueing games. He has published several papers in a variety of journals, such as Operations Research, Journal of the Operational Research Society, Operations Research Letters, etc.
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具有不耐烦的可观察M/G/ 1队列战略顾客行为分析
摘要本文提出了一个排队博弈论模型,分析了可观察M/G/1队列中顾客的策略行为和社会优化问题,该队列中到达的顾客基于一种新的二元随机奖励-成本结构来决定是否加入系统。每个进入队列的顾客都有一个相对的容忍时间。如果顾客的服务没有在他或她的相对容忍时间内开始(或结束),顾客将产生他或她的等待成本。首先利用Laplace-Stieltjes变换技术推导出客户均衡和社会最优连接策略的封闭解。此外,还进行了一些有代表性的数值实验,以使理论结果可视化。数值模拟说明了相对容忍时间对均衡策略和社会最优策略的影响。最后,我们比较了在可观察队列和不可观察队列中相对容忍时间对社会福利的影响。数值结果表明,可观察的队列导致更高的社会福利。该研究为系统提供者设计更经济、可持续的公共服务系统提供了指导。关键字:可观察M/G/1排队;不耐心;均衡策略;社会福利感谢编辑和两位审稿人提出的建设性和深刻的意见和建议,大大改善了本文的表达和质量。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。项目资助:国家自然科学基金项目(72201072,12071487)、广东省哲学社会科学规划项目(GD23XGL072)、浙江省教育厅科研基金项目(2022B1515120060)资助。作者简介张景川,现任杭州师范大学阿里巴巴商学院助理教授。2022年毕业于中国长沙中南大学数学专业,获博士学位。2019年9月至2020年9月在美国华盛顿特区乔治城大学麦克多诺商学院访问博士研究生。主要研究方向为运筹学、随机过程、排队理论、排队博弈、数学建模。在《铁路运筹学》、《运筹学快报》、《工业与管理优化学报》等国际专业期刊上发表论文多篇。刘在明,中南大学数学与统计学院教授,中国长沙。1988年获中南大学数学博士学位。他以合著者的形式出版了三本书,并在各种期刊上发表了100多篇研究论文,如应用数学快报,应用数学与计算,应用数学建模,计算机与运筹学,计算机与数学与应用,运筹学年鉴,数学分析与应用杂志。主要研究方向为马尔可夫过程及其应用、排队理论和随机模型。陈刚,广州大学管理学院副教授。2019 - 2022年中山大学商学院博士后,2016年获中南大学数学专业硕士学位,2019年获中南大学数学专业博士学位。他目前的研究兴趣集中在随机模型、基于灵敏度的优化、马尔可夫决策过程和排队博弈。在《运筹学》、《运筹学学报》、《运筹学快报》等期刊上发表论文多篇。
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来源期刊
Quality Technology and Quantitative Management
Quality Technology and Quantitative Management ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL-OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
CiteScore
5.10
自引率
21.40%
发文量
47
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: Quality Technology and Quantitative Management is an international refereed journal publishing original work in quality, reliability, queuing service systems, applied statistics (including methodology, data analysis, simulation), and their applications in business and industrial management. The journal publishes both theoretical and applied research articles using statistical methods or presenting new results, which solve or have the potential to solve real-world management problems.
期刊最新文献
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