Face-to-face with a madman

Abstract

AbstractWhat is it like to negotiate with a ‘madman’? What are the behavioural traits typical of him? How might being ‘mad’ enable him to take advantage of his counterpart? Conversely, what harm can it do to him? How might such negotiation style impact international politics? I advance four arguments, derived primarily from insights in microsociology and from a close study of Hitler, Khrushchev, Saddam, Gaddafi and Milošević. First, face-to-face interactions are sui generis as a channel of communication because interlocutors are subject to the imperatives of time (to act and react swiftly), space (on the spot) and competence. Second, the ‘madman’ is ‘mad’ because he exploits these imperatives to dominate others. He manipulates and even disrupts the ‘rhythm’ of an interaction, through constant and unexpected swings in mood, pace and level of courteousness. Third, contrary to the image of him in popular perception, the ‘mad’ leader is for the most part rather composed and clear-headed, if not calculating, even when expressing anger. Finally, being ‘mad’ can backfire in the long run. Whether it is advisable to be ‘mad’ from a utilitarian perspective may depend on how long a leader expects his tenure to last. I thank Roseanne McManus, Zachary Jacobson and Rose McDermott for their comments on an earlier draft of this article at the 2021 Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. I am grateful to the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their detailed feedback and constructive criticism. I am also much indebted to Aimee Wong for her superb research support.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1 I use masculine pronouns because most world leaders, past and present, have been male. More pertinently, leaders perceived as ‘mad’ have invariably been male. Diplomacy is heavily gendered, with men occupying not only most high offices, but also important diplomatic posts (Aggestam and Towns Citation2018; Towns and Niklasson 2017). In the fourth section of this article, in which I discuss how a reputation for madness may backfire, I hypothesise how that might especially be true for female leaders.2 The empirical focus of this article is on world leaders. But the claims made may equally apply to other high-level diplomats (the US Secretary of State, foreign ministers, special envoys, etc.) tasked with managing, formulating, and conducting their country’s foreign policy.3 The cases of Hitler, Khrushchev, Saddam, and Gaddafi are selected after McManus (2019, 989). According to her, these leaders most evoke the image of a ‘madman’ in popular perception because they evinced the associated traits discussed earlier. I add to them a fifth and relatively contemporary candidate, Milošević. The Serbian leader developed a comparable reputation. For instance, US President Bill Clinton once called him ‘another Hitler’, a ‘madman’ (The Guardian, “Refugees feeling NATO bombs, says Milosevic,” Apr 23, 1999). So had those who negotiated with him in person, such as US ambassador James W. Pardew (2018, 7). French journalist Florence Hartmann had written a book, entitled Milosevic, la diagonale du fou, with a similar premise (Hartmann Citation2002).4 See, for instance, the seminal text by Pruitt and Carnevale (Citation1993), or popular textbooks such as Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders Citation2020.5 Short, Williams, and Christie Citation1976. For a review, see Oh, Bailenson, and Welch Citation2018.6 Daft and Lengel Citation1984. For a review, see Ishii, Lyons, and Carr Citation2019.7 However, they would be skeptical as well. Without the opportunity to know these leaders in person, they would challenge not only the reliability of such an inquiry but also its ethics. As part of what has come to be known the ‘Goldwater Rule’, Section 7.3 of the American Psychiatric Association’s Principles of Medical Ethics (2013) states that ‘it is unethical for a psychiatrist to offer a professional opinion unless he or she has conducted an examination [of the individual in person] and has been granted proper authorization for such a statement.’8 As the veteran British diplomat Carne Ross writes, as what he calls ‘the apotheosis of the diplomat,’ the ambassador’s ‘demeanor is friendly but grave. His expression says that he is a man to be taken seriously: he has much on his mind. He may frown but he will never grimace. He may raise his voice, but he will never shout. Measure is his mien. In all things, measure… [T]he ambassador has learned to hold any emotion in check and to articulate what he has to say precisely and efficiently. Few words are wasted, except when many words are needed… This portrait is an amalgam of ambassadors I have known’ (Ross Citation2007, 130, 233).9 An analogous example of a leader who is keen to utilise such aggressive style to rein in and dominate others in the context of American politics was Lyndon B. Johnson. As the Senate majority leader, Johnson would ‘envelop’ his target, a fellow senator, and give him the so-called ‘Johnson Treatment’. As Evans and Novak described it, his tone ‘could be supplication, accusation, cajolery, exuberance, scorn, tears, complaint, and the hint of threat. It was all of these together. It ran the gamut of human emotions. Its velocity was breathtaking and it was all in one direction. Interjections from the target were rare. Johnson anticipated them before they could be spoken. He moved in close, his face a scant millimeter from his target, his eyes widening and narrowing, his eyebrows rising and falling.’ The infamous ‘Treatment’ was ‘an almost hypnotic experience and rendered the target stunned and helpless’ (Evans and Novak Citation1966, 115).10 John Moberly. Interview by Gwenda Scarlett. October 23, 2002. Churchill Archives Centre. GBR/0014/DOHP 96.11 “Slobodan Milosevic and the Road to Dayton” and “Negotiating the Dayton Peace Accords.” 2014. Rudolf Perina’s interview with Charles Stuart Kennedy in December 2006. Association for Diplomacy Studies and Training.12 ‘Interview With Zain Verjee of CNN,’ US Department of State Archive, 6 September 2008. Accessible at https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/09/109223.htm.13 This observation may be especially applicable to female leaders. The gendered dichotomy of international politics means that compared to men, women – leaders and diplomats included – are more likely to be consigned to the realm of irrationality (Tickner Citation1992). Simply put, others may be quicker to attribute a female leader who exhibit the said traits of the ‘madman’ in a diplomatic encounter to her disposition, rather than seeing her behaviour as rational and thought-out expressions of concerns, interests, and intentions, and thus be dismissive of her. Recent research has shown that because of such dichotomy, female leaders often feel the urge to combat gender stereotypes in crisis bargaining by overcompensating with their behaviour (Schwartz and Blair Citation2020; Bashevkin Citation2018; Post and Sen Citation2020; Schramm and Stark Citation2020). That could explain why, despite the increasing number of female leaders in recent decades, there has yet to be any (to my knowledge) who has earned the moniker of a ‘madwoman’. On the contrary, many female leaders have acquired a reputation – perhaps deliberately cultivated on their part – for the opposite. Like her (stereotyped and idealized) male counterparts, she is steadfast, stoical, and level-headed. Consider, for instance, Margaret Thatcher, Angela Merkel, Golda Meir and Madeline Albright (all four have to various extents been called their country’s ‘Iron Lady’) (Davies Citation2022, 246-247).Additional informationFundingThis research was completed in part with the financial support of the Early Career Scheme (Project Number: 24602217) and General Research Fund (Project Number: 14619721), Research Grants Council, Hong Kong.Notes on contributorsSeanon S. WongSeanon S. Wong is an Associate Professor at the Department of Government and Public Administration and the Director of the International Affairs Research Centre, the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. His academic interests include international relations theory, security studies, diplomacy, political psychology, identity and intergroup conflicts, and the international relations of East Asia (particularly China). He received the Anthony Deos Young Scholar Award (2022) and the Article Award (2017) from the Diplomatic Studies Section of the International Studies Association. Email: seanwong@cuhk.edu.hk