The financial institutions incentives when they place financial assets with credit risk to retail investors

Ramiro Losada
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Abstract

This paper analyzes the conflict of interest that exists when a financial institution issues and places a financial asset with credit risk among retail investors. Four regulatory measures are presented and analyzed in order to improve retail investors protection. Theoretically, it is shown that two of these measures, setting a price cap to the issue and an adequate enforcement could implement a first best social optimum.

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当金融机构将具有信用风险的金融资产投放给散户投资者时,它们会起到激励作用
本文分析了金融机构向散户投资者发行和投放具有信用风险的金融资产时存在的利益冲突。提出并分析了加强对散户保护的四项监管措施。从理论上讲,这表明其中两项措施,设定价格上限和适当的执法可以实现第一个最佳社会最优。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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