Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda

IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2022-12-10 DOI:10.1007/s00355-022-01436-0
Umberto Grandi, Jérôme Lang, Ali I. Ozkes, Stéphane Airiau
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Abstract

We consider a set of voters making a collective decision via simultaneous vote on two binary issues. Voters’ preferences are captured by payoffs assigned to combinations of outcomes for each issue and they can be nonseparable: a voter’s preference over an issue might be dependent on the other issue. When the collective decision in this context is reached by voting on both issues at the same time, multiple election paradoxes may arise, as studied extensively in the theoretical literature. In this paper we pursue an experimental approach and investigate the impact of iterative voting, in which groups deliberate by repeating the voting process until a final outcome is reached. Our results from experiments run in the lab show that voters tend to have an optimistic rather than a pessimistic behaviour when casting a vote on a non-separable issue and that iterated voting may in fact improve the social outcome. We provide the first comprehensive empirical analysis of individual and collective behavior in the multiple referendum setting.

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单次和迭代多次公投中的投票行为
我们考虑一组选民通过对两个二元问题同时投票来做出集体决定。选民的偏好是通过分配给每个问题的结果组合的收益来体现的,它们可能是不可分离的:选民对一个问题的偏好可能取决于另一个问题。当这种情况下的集体决策是通过同时对两个问题进行投票来达成时,就可能出现多重选举悖论,这在理论文献中得到了广泛的研究。在本文中,我们采用实验方法并研究迭代投票的影响,其中群体通过重复投票过程进行审议,直到达到最终结果。我们在实验室进行的实验结果表明,选民在对不可分离的问题投票时倾向于乐观而不是悲观,反复投票实际上可能会改善社会结果。我们首次对多重公投背景下的个人和集体行为进行了全面的实证分析。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
11.10%
发文量
56
期刊介绍: Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf
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