Quasi-Insider Shareholder Activism: Corporate Governance at the Periphery of Control

IF 1.9 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Review of Corporate Finance Studies Pub Date : 2023-07-14 DOI:10.1093/rcfs/cfad016
Jonathan Cohn, Mitch Towner, Aazam Virani
{"title":"Quasi-Insider Shareholder Activism: Corporate Governance at the Periphery of Control","authors":"Jonathan Cohn, Mitch Towner, Aazam Virani","doi":"10.1093/rcfs/cfad016","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We analyze shareholder activism by “quasi-insiders”: founders, former executives, and other individuals tangentially connected to a firm. These individuals seek control in their campaigns, use aggressive tactics, and target smaller, poorly performing firms. Their campaigns are associated with positive announcement returns. Former CEOs who engage in campaigns often depart from the target under negative circumstances before launching their campaigns soon afterward. Our results suggest that insiders at the periphery of control may intervene in firms too small for traditional activists to target.","PeriodicalId":44656,"journal":{"name":"Review of Corporate Finance Studies","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Corporate Finance Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfad016","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

We analyze shareholder activism by “quasi-insiders”: founders, former executives, and other individuals tangentially connected to a firm. These individuals seek control in their campaigns, use aggressive tactics, and target smaller, poorly performing firms. Their campaigns are associated with positive announcement returns. Former CEOs who engage in campaigns often depart from the target under negative circumstances before launching their campaigns soon afterward. Our results suggest that insiders at the periphery of control may intervene in firms too small for traditional activists to target.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
准内部人股东激进主义:控制边缘的公司治理
我们分析了“准内部人士”的股东行动主义:创始人、前高管和其他与公司有密切关系的个人。这些人在他们的活动中寻求控制,使用激进的策略,并瞄准规模较小,表现不佳的公司。他们的活动与积极的公告回报有关。参与竞选活动的前首席执行官通常会在不利的情况下离开目标,然后很快发起竞选活动。我们的研究结果表明,处于控制边缘的内部人士可能会对规模太小的公司进行干预,而传统的激进投资者无法将其作为目标。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
17.80
自引率
1.80%
发文量
35
期刊介绍: The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (RCFS) is dedicated to publishing high-quality research in the expansive field of Corporate Finance. The journal seeks original contributions, reviewing papers based on their unique insights into Corporate Finance. This encompasses a wide spectrum, including a firm's interactions with stakeholders, capital markets, internal organization structure, compensation mechanisms, corporate governance, and capital management. RCFS also welcomes research in financial intermediation, financial institutions, microstructure, and the implications of asset pricing for Corporate Finance. The journal considers theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers for review.
期刊最新文献
Product Market Competition, Mergers and Acquisitions, and Covenant Redesign Higher Purpose, Employees, and the Firm Employer Dominance and Worker Earnings in Finance The Geography of Investor Attention Human Capital Reallocation across Firms: Evidence from Idiosyncratic Shocks
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1