Inquiry beyond knowledge

IF 1.3 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2023-12-08 DOI:10.1111/phpr.13042
Bob Beddor
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Abstract

Why engage in inquiry? According to many philosophers, the goal of inquiring into some question is to come to know its answer. While this view holds considerable appeal, this paper argues that it stands in tension with another highly attractive thesis: knowledge does not require absolute certainty. Forced to choose between these two theses, I argue that we should reject the idea that inquiry aims at knowledge. I go on to develop an alternative view, according to which inquiry aims at maximizing the epistemic value of our credences. This alternative view makes room for knowledge that falls shy of certainty, and it coheres nicely with a rich body of work in epistemic decision theory. I proceed to highlight the implications of this replacement for some important topics in epistemology, including the dogmatism paradox, the nature of interrogative attitudes, and the norm of practical reasoning.
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超越知识的探究
为什么要参与调查?根据许多哲学家的观点,探究某个问题的目的是要知道它的答案。虽然这一观点具有相当大的吸引力,但本文认为,它与另一个非常有吸引力的论点:知识并不需要绝对的确定性。如果被迫在这两种观点之间做出选择,我认为我们应该拒绝“探究的目标是知识”这一观点。我继续发展另一种观点,根据这种观点,探究的目的是最大化我们凭证的认知价值。这种另类观点为缺乏确定性的知识提供了空间,它与认识论决策理论的大量工作很好地结合在一起。接下来,我将强调这种替代对认识论中一些重要主题的影响,包括教条主义悖论、疑问态度的本质和实践推理的规范。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.50
自引率
6.70%
发文量
57
期刊介绍: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research publishes articles in a wide range of areas including philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and philosophical history of philosophy. No specific methodology or philosophical orientation is required for submissions.
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