Do advisory directors increase discretionary accruals?

Abstract

Purpose This study aims to examine whether the presence of advisory directors affects firm discretionary accruals (DACC), a widely used proxy for financial reporting quality. The authors argue that the advisory director weakens the board monitoring role and impairs the firm financial reporting quality by increasing DACC. Design/methodology/approach The sample consists of listed firms on the Australian Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2015 using 7,649 firm-year observations. The authors perform descriptive statistics, regression and propensity score matching analyses to examine the research hypothesis. Findings The research evidence that firms with a higher presence of advisory directors have more DACC, indicating poor financial reporting quality. Furthermore, the authors categorize the DACC and find that the firm has higher income-increasing DACC in the presence of higher advisory directors. The findings are robust concerning endogeneity issues. Research limitations/implications The research evidence that firms with a higher presence of advisory directors have more DACC, indicating poor financial reporting quality. Furthermore, the authors categorize the DACC and find that the firm has higher income-increasing DACC in the presence of higher advisory directors. The findings are robust concerning endogeneity issues. Practical implications The research contributes valuable insights for regulators and policymakers seeking to comprehend the implications of firms using more advisory directors. Additionally, the authors recognize the potential significance of the findings for the institution of directors, as they can provide a nuanced understanding of the specific roles played by advisory directors in organizational dynamics. Originality/value While the extensive body of literature on corporate governance and financial reporting quality has been well-established, a noticeable void exists in academic research delving into the relationship between advisory directors and DACC management. This study seeks to fill this gap, making a distinctive and original contribution to the existing literature on corporate governance.