Automating Collision Attacks on RIPEMD-160

IF 1.7 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology Pub Date : 2023-12-08 DOI:10.46586/tosc.v2023.i4.112-142
Yingxin Li, Fukang Liu, Gaoli Wang
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Abstract

As an ISO/IEC standard, the hash function RIPEMD-160 has been used to generate the Bitcoin address with SHA-256. However, due to the complex doublebranch structure of RIPEMD-160, the best collision attack only reaches 36 out of 80 steps of RIPEMD-160, and the best semi-free-start (SFS) collision attack only reaches 40 steps. To improve the 36-step collision attack proposed at EUROCRYPT 2023, we explored the possibility of using different message differences to increase the number of attacked steps, and we finally identified one choice allowing a 40-step collision attack. To find the corresponding 40-step differential characteristic, we re-implement the MILP-based method to search for signed differential characteristics with SAT/SMT. As a result, we can find a colliding message pair for 40-step RIPEMD-160 in practical time, which significantly improves the best collision attack on RIPEMD-160. For the best SFS collision attack published at ToSC 2019, we observe that the bottleneck is the probability of the right-branch differential characteristics as they are fully uncontrolled in the message modification. To address this issue, we utilize our SAT/SMT-based tool to search for high-probability differential characteristics for the right branch. Consequently, we can mount successful SFS collision attacks on 41, 42 and 43 steps of RIPEMD-160, thus significantly improving the SFS collision attacks. In addition, we also searched for a 44-step differential characteristic, but the differential probability is too low to allow a meaningful SFS collision attack.
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自动对 RIPEMD-160 进行碰撞攻击
作为 ISO/IEC 标准,哈希函数 RIPEMD-160 被用来生成 SHA-256 的比特币地址。然而,由于 RIPEMD-160 的双分支结构复杂,最佳碰撞攻击只能达到 RIPEMD-160 80 步中的 36 步,最佳半自由启动(SFS)碰撞攻击只能达到 40 步。为了改进在 EUROCRYPT 2023 上提出的 36 步碰撞攻击,我们探索了使用不同报文差分来增加攻击步数的可能性,最终确定了一种允许 40 步碰撞攻击的选择。为了找到相应的 40 步差分特征,我们重新实施了基于 MILP 的方法,用 SAT/SMT 搜索签名差分特征。结果,我们可以在实际时间内找到 40 步 RIPEMD-160 的碰撞报文对,大大改进了 RIPEMD-160 的最佳碰撞攻击。对于在 ToSC 2019 上发布的最佳 SFS 碰撞攻击,我们观察到瓶颈在于右分支差分特征的概率,因为它们在消息修改中完全不受控制。为了解决这个问题,我们利用基于 SAT/SMT 的工具来搜索右分支的高概率差分特征。因此,我们可以对 RIPEMD-160 的 41、42 和 43 步成功发起 SFS 碰撞攻击,从而大大改进了 SFS 碰撞攻击。此外,我们还搜索了 44 步差分特征,但差分概率太低,无法进行有意义的 SFS 碰撞攻击。
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来源期刊
IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology Mathematics-Applied Mathematics
CiteScore
5.50
自引率
22.90%
发文量
37
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