How do investors perceive corporate general counsel? The role of monitoring and advising demand

IF 3.3 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2024-01-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107175
Zhihong Chen , Yun Ke , Ke Wang
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Abstract

We find that firms with a general counsel (GC) in top management (GC firms) have a higher ex-ante cost of equity implied in stock prices and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Lead-lag changes analysis shows that the cost of equity increases after, but not before, the appointment of GCs to top management. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that the cost of equity difference between GC and non-GC firms and the cost of equity increase following the appointment of GCs to top management are more pronounced for firms with greater monitoring demand and less pronounced for firms with greater advising demand. We also observe negative market reactions to proxy statements that reveal the appointment of a GC to top management. Finally, our falsification tests find no evidence that investors react to the addition of Chief Marketing Officers, Chief Operating Officers, or Chief Financial Officers to top management. Overall, our results suggest that investors’ perceptions of including GCs in top management depend on the firm’s demand for monitoring and advising.

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投资者如何看待公司总法律顾问?监督和建议需求的作用
我们发现,最高管理层中有总法律顾问(GC)的公司(GC 公司),其股票价格和分析师盈利预测中隐含的事前股权成本较高。滞后变化分析表明,股权成本在总法律顾问被任命为最高管理层之后而不是之前就会增加。横截面分析表明,对于监督需求较大的公司而言,GC 和非 GC 公司之间的股权成本差异以及任命 GC 进入高层管理后的股权成本上升更为明显,而对于咨询需求较大的公司而言,则不那么明显。我们还观察到,市场对披露任命 GC 进入高层管理的代理声明的负面反应。最后,我们的证伪测试没有发现投资者对最高管理层增设首席营销官、首席运营官或首席财务官做出反应的证据。总之,我们的研究结果表明,投资者对将首席风险官纳入最高管理层的看法取决于公司对监督和建议的需求。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
2.80%
发文量
75
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.
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