Acquirers’ political connections and bargaining outcomes in corporate takeover negotiations: Evidence from antitrust reviews

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-02 DOI:10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100399
Simon Yu Kit Fung, Lawrence (Hong) Huang
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Abstract

We examine how acquirers’ political connections affect takeover bargaining that involves significant regulatory uncertainties, when the target’s options of putting itself to another bidder are restricted. Opposite to prior takeover theories, we show that a politically connected acquirer pays a lower (rather than higher) takeover premium to and shares a smaller portion of the takeover gains with the target in the context of antitrust reviews, consistent with a bargaining benefit for the connected acquirer. Corroborating this bargaining argument, we find that the results are more pronounced in situations where: (1) the antitrust concerns are more severe; (2) the targets have fewer outside options other than the connected acquirers; and (3) the acquirers’ political connections are more valuable. Our results highlight the value of political connections to shareholders in takeovers, affecting not only the likelihood of completion but also the bargaining outcomes of the deal under the shadow of costly regulation.

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收购方的政治关系与企业收购谈判中的讨价还价结果:来自反垄断审查的证据
我们研究了收购方的政治关系如何影响涉及重大监管不确定性的收购讨价还价,此时目标公司向另一竞购者提出收购的选择受到了限制。与之前的收购理论相反,我们的研究表明,在反垄断审查的背景下,有政治关系的收购方会向目标公司支付较低(而非较高)的收购溢价,并与目标公司分享较小部分的收购收益,这与有政治关系的收购方的讨价还价利益是一致的。为了证实这种讨价还价的论点,我们发现在以下情况下结果更为明显(1) 反垄断问题更加严重;(2) 除关联收购方外,目标公司的外部选择更少;(3) 收购方的政治关系更有价值。我们的研究结果凸显了股东政治关系在收购中的价值,它不仅影响收购完成的可能性,还影响在高成本监管阴影下交易的讨价还价结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
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