Managerial overconfidence and classification shifting

Abstract

This study examines whether overconfident CEOs engage in classification shifting. We find that managerial overconfidence is related to an increase in unexpected core earnings via reclassifying recurring expenses as special items. This finding is robust to controlling for firms’ propensity to engage in accruals management and real earnings management, using a subsample of non-zero income-decreasing special items, employing alternative measures of overconfidence, and controlling for CEO and firm fixed effects. We further find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to engage in classification shifting when the incentives are stronger, i.e., when CEOs want to meet or beat analyst forecasts, when CEOs’ pay is highly sensitive to core earnings, and when CEOs have low managerial ability. Overconfident CEOs are also more likely to engage in classification shifting when there are more opportunities for misconduct, i.e., when financial statement comparability is low and when the CEO can use opportunistic special items to misclassify expenses. Overall, we find that overconfident CEOs are intentionally, rather than unintentionally, engaging in classification shifting to boost core earnings.