A Case for Pay Secrecy

IF 1 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2024-01-04 DOI:10.1093/aler/ahad004
Tomer Blumkin, David Lagziel, Yoram Margalioth
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In this paper, we study a labor market setup in which workers exhibit relative remuneration concerns with respect to their peers. We first characterize the optimal labor contract offered by the firm and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the desirability of incorporating pay-secrecy clauses in such a contract. We then demonstrate that, in contrast to conventional wisdom viewing wage-secrecy arrangements as detrimental for workers, the latter may, in fact, gain from the lack of pay transparency.
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薪酬保密的理由
在本文中,我们研究了一种劳动力市场环境,在这种环境中,工人会表现出与同龄人相比对薪酬的相对关注。我们首先描述了企业提供的最优劳动合同的特征,并为在这种合同中纳入工资保密条款的可取性提供了必要条件和充分条件。然后,我们证明,与传统观点认为工资保密安排不利于工人的观点不同,后者实际上可能会从缺乏薪酬透明度中获益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
9
期刊介绍: The rise of the field of law and economics has been extremely rapid over the last 25 years. Among important developments of the 1990s has been the founding of the American Law and Economics Association. The creation and rapid expansion of the ALEA and the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada attest to the growing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policy-makers.
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