{"title":"Public Versus Private Investment in Education in a Two Tiers System: The Role of Income Inequality and Intergenerational Persistence in Education","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s40797-023-00256-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>This paper provides a simple political economy model of hierarchical education to study the endogenous determination of the public education budget and its allocation between different tiers of education (basic and advanced). The model integrates private education decisions by allowing parents, who are differentiated according to income and human capital, to opt out of the public system and enrol their offspring at private universities. Majority voting decides the size of the budget allocated to education and the expenditure composition. The model exhibits a potential for multiple equilibria and ‘low education’ traps. Income inequality and the intergenerational persistence of educational attainments play a fundamental role in deciding the equilibrium. The main predictions of the theory are broadly consistent with descriptive cross-country evidence collected for 43 high-middle income countries.</p>","PeriodicalId":43048,"journal":{"name":"Italian Economic Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Italian Economic Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40797-023-00256-0","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
This paper provides a simple political economy model of hierarchical education to study the endogenous determination of the public education budget and its allocation between different tiers of education (basic and advanced). The model integrates private education decisions by allowing parents, who are differentiated according to income and human capital, to opt out of the public system and enrol their offspring at private universities. Majority voting decides the size of the budget allocated to education and the expenditure composition. The model exhibits a potential for multiple equilibria and ‘low education’ traps. Income inequality and the intergenerational persistence of educational attainments play a fundamental role in deciding the equilibrium. The main predictions of the theory are broadly consistent with descriptive cross-country evidence collected for 43 high-middle income countries.
期刊介绍：
Italian Economic Journal (ItEJ) is the official peer-reviewed journal of the Italian Economic Association. ItEJ publishes scientific articles in all areas of economics and economic policy, providing a scholarly, international forum for all methodological approaches and schools of thought. In particular, ItEJ aims at encouraging and disseminating high-quality research on the Italian and the European economy. To fulfill this aim, the journal welcomes applied, institutional and theoretical papers on relevant and timely issues concerning the European and Italian economic debate.ItEJ merges the Rivista Italiana degli Economisti (RIE), the journal founded by the Italian Economic Association in 1996, with the Giornale degli Economisti (GdE), founded in 1875 and enriched by contributions from renowned economists, including Amoroso, Black, Barone, De Viti de Marco, Edgeworth, Einaudi, Modigliani, Pantaleoni, Pareto, Slutsky, Tinbergen and Walras.
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