8 Valued Non-Deterministic Semantics for Modal Logics

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to study a particular family of non-deterministic semantics for modal logics that has eight truth-values. These eight-valued semantics can be traced back to Omori and Skurt (2016), where a particular member of this family was used to characterize the normal modal logic K. The truth-values in these semantics convey information about a proposition’s truth/falsity, whether the proposition is necessary/not necessary, and whether it is possible/not possible. Each of these triples is represented by a unique value. In this paper we will study which modal logics can be obtained by changing the interpretation of the \(\Box \) modality, assuming that the interpretation of other connectives stays constant. We will show what axioms are responsible for a particular interpretations of \(\Box \). Furthermore, we will study subsets of these axioms. We show that some of the combinations of the axioms are equivalent to well-known modal axioms. We apply the level-valuation technique to all of the systems to regain the closure under the rule of necessitation. We also point out that some of the resulting logics are not sublogics of S5 and comment briefly on the corresponding frame conditions that are forced by these axioms. Ultimately, we sketch a proof of meta-completeness for all of these systems.