Prevention as a norm cluster? Mapping China's contestation on atrocity prevention

Abstract

This article argues that China's rhetorical support for prevention at the United Nations obscures its underlying contestation of atrocity prevention in both conception and practice. It introduces a novel conceptual framework, coined as the two-level norm cluster of prevention, which includes three conceptually aligned yet distinct parts: operational conflict prevention, direct atrocity prevention and root-cause prevention. Drawing on interviews and policy documents, this article finds that China conflates direct atrocity prevention with operational conflict prevention, with a preference for the agenda of conflict prevention, as seen in China's divergent commitments to preventing armed conflicts and peacetime atrocities. This conflation represents a deliberate political choice rather than a result of misunderstanding or lack of knowledge regarding their distinctions. China also endorses a strong linkage between direct atrocity prevention and development-focused root cause prevention. Despite China's growing assertiveness in shaping liberal norms and the favourable perception of its development-focused approaches among elite groups in host states, the Chinese government hesitates to officially promote the scholarly concept of developmental peace and present it as an alternative to the existing liberal principles. This reluctance reflects China's intention to avoid explicit confrontation with liberal norms and its concerns about the potential failure of norm entrepreneurship.