The false promise of nuclear risk reduction

Abstract

In a context of intensifying great power competition and deep divergences of view between nuclear and non-nuclear powers on the urgency of nuclear abolition, ‘nuclear risk reduction’ has gained renewed attention as a pragmatic framework for managing and progressively reducing nuclear dangers. The idea is simple: with more fundamental policy changes either undesirable or out of reach, advocates of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament should focus their efforts on the international community's shared interest in reducing the risk of nuclear use and escalation, identifying and implementing limited measures to sequester nuclear risk scenarios. Drawing on historical scholarship, archival documents and theories of ‘normal’ and ‘epistemic’ accidents, we argue that the risk reduction agenda offers a false promise for those seeking durable, shared solutions to the nuclear predicament. The risk reduction framework demands access to an unattainable level of knowledge, encourages overconfidence in managerial control and fails to provide meaningful policy guidance. Examining in detail the scholarship of Thomas Schelling, we maintain that the risk reduction agenda remains heavily circumscribed by the requirements of credible nuclear deterrence.