On the idea that all future tensed contingents are false

Abstract

1 INTRODUCTION

In ‘The Open Future’ (2021), Patrick Todd argues that the future is open and that, as a consequence, all future contingents are false (as opposed to the more common view that they are neither true nor false). Very roughly, this latter claim is motivated by the idea that (a) presentism is true, and so future (and indeed past) things1 do not exist, and (b) if future things do not exist, then the only thing that could ground there being future tensed facts, and hence make those future tensed claims true, is the present and the laws of nature. But (c) the present and the laws of nature cannot ground there being future tensed facts because they do not necessitate there being any such fact. Hence, future tensed claims are all false. Todd then goes on to present a semantics for his version of the open future in which all future contingents are false. In what follows, we take up two strands of Todd's view. First, we begin, in Section 2, by outlining Todd's argument that future contingents are all false. We suggest that the considerations that Todd adduces to this conclusion do not support this being so. Then, in Section 3, we consider the semantics that Todd offers and argue that it yields implausible consequences.