{"title":"A game-theoretic implication of the Riemann hypothesis","authors":"Christian Ewerhart","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The Riemann hypothesis (RH) is one of the major unsolved problems in pure mathematics. In the present paper, a parameterized family of non-cooperative games is constructed with the property that, if RH is true, then any game in the family admits a unique Nash equilibrium. We argue that this result is not degenerate. Indeed, neither is the conclusion a tautology, nor is RH used to define the family of games.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"128 ","pages":"Pages 52-59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000167/pdfft?md5=f43e23ae61ca2ca71d6971f39fd4c1a4&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489624000167-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Mathematical Social Sciences","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000167","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The Riemann hypothesis (RH) is one of the major unsolved problems in pure mathematics. In the present paper, a parameterized family of non-cooperative games is constructed with the property that, if RH is true, then any game in the family admits a unique Nash equilibrium. We argue that this result is not degenerate. Indeed, neither is the conclusion a tautology, nor is RH used to define the family of games.
期刊介绍:
The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences.
Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models.
Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.