{"title":"Flow Allocation Games","authors":"Nils Bertschinger, Martin Hoefer, Daniel Schmand","doi":"10.1287/moor.2022.0355","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges. Given the strategy choices of all agents, a maximal circulation that adheres to the chosen allocation strategies evolves in the network. Each agent wants to maximize the amount of flow through his or her node. Flow allocation games can be used to express strategic incentives of clearing in financial networks. We provide a cumulative set of results on the existence and computational complexity of pure Nash and strong equilibria as well as tight bounds on the (strong) prices of anarchy and stability. Our results show an interesting dichotomy. Ranking strategies over individual flow units allows us to obtain optimal strong equilibria for many objective functions. In contrast, more intuitive ranking strategies over edges can give rise to unfavorable incentive properties.Funding: This work was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Research Group ADYN [411362735].","PeriodicalId":1,"journal":{"name":"Accounts of Chemical Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":16.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Accounts of Chemical Research","FirstCategoryId":"100","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.0355","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"化学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges. Given the strategy choices of all agents, a maximal circulation that adheres to the chosen allocation strategies evolves in the network. Each agent wants to maximize the amount of flow through his or her node. Flow allocation games can be used to express strategic incentives of clearing in financial networks. We provide a cumulative set of results on the existence and computational complexity of pure Nash and strong equilibria as well as tight bounds on the (strong) prices of anarchy and stability. Our results show an interesting dichotomy. Ranking strategies over individual flow units allows us to obtain optimal strong equilibria for many objective functions. In contrast, more intuitive ranking strategies over edges can give rise to unfavorable incentive properties.Funding: This work was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Research Group ADYN [411362735].
期刊介绍：
Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance.
Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.
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