{"title":"Cet obscure object du désir (philosophique)","authors":"Pau Olmos","doi":"10.22329/il.v43i4.8311","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper is a response to H. Siegel’s “Arguing with Arguments” from a rhetorical perspective on argumentation. First I address Siegel’s concept of ‘argument in its abstract propositional sense’ and attempt to show that it is not at all an obvious object that should unquestionably be the privileged focus of argumentation theory. I then defend C. W. Tindale’s rhetorical perspective on argumentation against some of Siegel’s misreadings and also some of his legitimate disagreements regarding the relations between persuasion and rational justification and the way we should understand the source of argumentative normativity.","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":"21 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i4.8311","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper is a response to H. Siegel’s “Arguing with Arguments” from a rhetorical perspective on argumentation. First I address Siegel’s concept of ‘argument in its abstract propositional sense’ and attempt to show that it is not at all an obvious object that should unquestionably be the privileged focus of argumentation theory. I then defend C. W. Tindale’s rhetorical perspective on argumentation against some of Siegel’s misreadings and also some of his legitimate disagreements regarding the relations between persuasion and rational justification and the way we should understand the source of argumentative normativity.
本文从论证的修辞学视角出发,对西格尔(H. Siegel)的《用论据论证》(Argumenting with Arguments)一书作出回应。首先,我论述了西格尔的 "抽象命题意义上的论证 "概念,并试图说明它根本不是一个明显的对象,不应该毫无疑问地成为论证理论的重点。然后,我针对西格尔的一些误读,以及他在说服与理性论证之间的关系和我们应如何理解论证规范性的来源方面的一些合理的分歧,为 C. W. 廷代尔关于论证的修辞学观点辩护。