VoWi-Fi security threats: Address resolution protocol attack and countermeasures

Abstract

B5G/6G networks are facing challenges in the deployment of additional base stations. However, Taiwan's four major operators have launched VoWi-Fi calling services to maintain signal quality and coverage for customers. These services pose potential threats when users connect to untrusted Wi-Fi networks. Therefore, the authors utilised commercial equipment to study the security of VoWi-Fi calling services offered by Taiwan's four major telecom companies. The authors employed address resolution protocol attack methods to develop two verification attacks that bypass existing security measures: one for dropping session initiation protocol packets and the other for dropping voice call packets, both capable of circumventing current security defences. Through real-world experiments, the authors confirmed their feasibility and assessed their potential harm. Consequently, two defence methods are proposed. The first is an anti-attack algorithm for app and device manufacturers to detect the security of the user's calling environment. The second is a recommendation for telecom operators to implement new detection mechanisms to safeguard user rights.

The cover image is based on the Case Study VoWi-Fi security threats: Address resolution protocol attack and countermeasures by Kuan-Chu Lu et al., https://doi.org/10.1049/ntw2.12113