Coordination schemes for resource reallocation and patient transfer in hospital alliance models

IF 2.8 4区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT DECISION SCIENCES Pub Date : 2024-02-03 DOI:10.1111/deci.12622
Zhong-Ping Li, Jasmine Chang, Jim Shi, Jian-Jun Wang
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Abstract

In many countries, healthcare systems encounter the issue of imbalance between supply and demand in a hierarchical structure. The comprehensive hospitals, which possess more high-quality resources, are often overwhelmed, while their counterparts, community hospitals, are often idle. To address this imbalance issue, certain payment schemes are generally considered effective in motivating comprehensive hospitals to divert patients downstream via resource transfer. In addition to two particular payment schemes, namely, patient payment (PP) and fee-for-capacity (FFC), this study also considers two hospital alliance models, the government-led (GL-type) and the hospital-forged (HF-type) alliance, for effectively overcoming the imbalance issue. Compared to the HF-type alliance, in which each community hospital determines the price paid to the comprehensive hospital for transferring resources, the GL-type alliance requires the payment price to be set by the regulator. Methodologically, this study devises a three-stage sequential game to characterize the dynamics among the various entities, such as the regulator, the comprehensive hospital, the community hospitals, and the patients. Equilibrium results, in terms of the capacity sinking rate and patient transfer rate, are derived, and scheme and alliance performances are evaluated using various measurements, such as patient utility, and hospital and social welfare. We find that a direct payment scheme (FFC) under a centralized alliance model (GL-type alliance) is more effective for both making decisions (about the patient transfer rate, capacity sinking rate, and payment price) and the performances (of each hospital's welfare, patient welfare, the waiting time per patient, and social welfare). Furthermore, our study examines the impacts of the alliance scale and finds that social welfare is first decreasing and then increasing with alliance scale. Therefore, it is suggested to establish either a one-to-one hospital alliance (consisting of a comprehensive and a community hospital) or a large-scale (e.g., a comprehensive and 10 community hospitals) hospital alliance.

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医院联盟模式中的资源再分配和病人转院协调方案
在许多国家,医疗系统在分级结构中都会遇到供需失衡的问题。拥有更多优质资源的综合医院往往不堪重负,而与之相对应的社区医院却常常处于闲置状态。为解决这一失衡问题,人们普遍认为某些付费方案能有效地激励综合医院通过资源转移将病人分流到下游。除了病人付费(PP)和按能力收费(FFC)这两种特殊的付费方案外,本研究还考虑了政府主导型(GL 型)和医院主导型(HF 型)这两种医院联盟模式,以有效解决失衡问题。高频型联盟由各社区医院决定向综合医院支付的资源转移价格,而政府主导型联盟则要求支付价格由监管机构确定。在方法上,本研究设计了一个三阶段的连续博弈,以描述监管机构、综合医院、社区医院和患者等不同主体之间的动态关系。研究得出了容量下沉率和患者转院率的均衡结果,并利用患者效用、医院和社会福利等各种指标对计划和联盟的绩效进行了评估。我们发现,集中式联盟模式(GL 型联盟)下的直接支付计划(FFC)在决策(患者转院率、容量下沉率和支付价格)和绩效(各医院福利、患者福利、每位患者的候诊时间和社会福利)方面都更为有效。此外,我们的研究还考察了联盟规模的影响,发现社会福利随着联盟规模的扩大先降后升。因此,建议建立一对一的医院联盟(由一家综合医院和一家社区医院组成)或大规模的医院联盟(如一家综合医院和 10 家社区医院)。
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来源期刊
DECISION SCIENCES
DECISION SCIENCES MANAGEMENT-
CiteScore
12.40
自引率
1.80%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: Decision Sciences, a premier journal of the Decision Sciences Institute, publishes scholarly research about decision making within the boundaries of an organization, as well as decisions involving inter-firm coordination. The journal promotes research advancing decision making at the interfaces of business functions and organizational boundaries. The journal also seeks articles extending established lines of work assuming the results of the research have the potential to substantially impact either decision making theory or industry practice. Ground-breaking research articles that enhance managerial understanding of decision making processes and stimulate further research in multi-disciplinary domains are particularly encouraged.
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Issue Information IN THIS ISSUE Issue Information In this issue Explanation seeking and anomalous recommendation adherence in human-to-human versus human-to-artificial intelligence interactions
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