AI-informed acting: an Arendtian perspective

IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-09 DOI:10.1007/s11097-024-09962-1
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Abstract

In this paper, I will investigate the possible impact of weak artificial intelligence (more specifically, I will concentrate on deep learning) on human capability of action. For this goal, I will first address Arendt’s philosophy of action, which seeks to emphasize the distinguishing elements of action that set it apart from other forms of human activity. According to Arendt, action should be conceived as praxis, an activity that has its goal in its own very performance. The authentic meaning of action includes the “passion” for articulation of one’s own individuality; I can only manifest myself as a distinct personality insofar as I introduce myself as a novel beginning to the web of human interactions demonstrating both my relevance and distinction from others. From this Arendtian standpoint, I will analyse the impact of deep learning in modern AI from two possible angles. First, I will argue that the direct interaction between AI and action is impossible. Since AI operates on the principle of efficiency, it can neither suggest certain goals for action for us nor overtake their implementation because action is not guided by the instrumental need to be efficient but by the existential desire to be someone. Second, I will also analyse the possibility of the indirect impact of AI on action. More specifically, I analyse neural network’s ability to circulate actions among individuals based on mathematical calculation. As I will argue, the efficiency of this circulation that surpasses human cognitive capacities can potentially organize a broader network of interaction among individuals and serve as a catalyst for the ability to act.

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人工智能指导下的表演:阿伦特视角
摘要 在本文中,我将探讨弱人工智能(更具体地说,我将专注于深度学习)对人类行动能力可能产生的影响。为实现这一目标,我将首先论述阿伦特的行动哲学,该哲学旨在强调行动有别于其他形式人类活动的显著要素。根据阿伦特的观点,行动应被视为实践(praxis),是一种以自身表现为目标的活动。行动的真正意义包括表达自己个性的 "激情";只有当我将自己作为一个新的开端引入人类互动之网,表明我与他人的相关性和区别时,我才能表现出自己的独特个性。从阿伦特的这一观点出发,我将从两个可能的角度分析深度学习对现代人工智能的影响。首先,我将论证人工智能与行动之间的直接互动是不可能的。由于人工智能以效率为原则,因此它既不能为我们提出某些行动目标,也不能超越这些目标的实施,因为行动不是以工具性的高效需求为指导,而是以 "成为某个人 "的存在欲望为指导。其次,我还将分析人工智能对行动产生间接影响的可能性。更具体地说,我将分析神经网络在数学计算的基础上在个人之间传播行动的能力。正如我将论证的那样,这种超越人类认知能力的循环效率有可能组织起更广泛的个体间互动网络,并成为行动能力的催化剂。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
8.70%
发文量
72
期刊介绍: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is an interdisciplinary, international journal that serves as a forum to explore the intersections between phenomenology, empirical science, and analytic philosophy of mind. The journal represents an attempt to build bridges between continental phenomenological approaches (in the tradition following Husserl) and disciplines that have not always been open to or aware of phenomenological contributions to understanding cognition and related topics. The journal welcomes contributions by phenomenologists, scientists, and philosophers who study cognition, broadly defined to include issues that are open to both phenomenological and empirical investigation, including perception, emotion, language, and so forth. In addition the journal welcomes discussions of methodological issues that involve the variety of approaches appropriate for addressing these problems.    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences also publishes critical review articles that address recent work in areas relevant to the connection between empirical results in experimental science and first-person perspective.Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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