Keaotshepha Karabo, Comfort Sekga, Connor Kissack, Mhlambululi Mafu, Francesco Petruccione
{"title":"A novel quantum key distribution resistant against large-pulse attacks","authors":"Keaotshepha Karabo, Comfort Sekga, Connor Kissack, Mhlambululi Mafu, Francesco Petruccione","doi":"10.1049/qtc2.12089","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security by leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics. This means the security is independent of all future advances in algorithm or computational power. However, due to the non-availability of single-photon sources, most traditional QKD protocols are vulnerable to various attacks, such as photon number-splitting (PNS) attacks. Also, the imperfections in the measuring devices open a loophole for side channels that an eavesdropper may exploit to launch attacks such as large-pulse attacks. As a result, this compromises the security of transmitted information. To address these challenges, the authors present a QKD protocol that is secure against both large-pulse attacks and PNS attacks at zero-error, in which the eavesdropper does not introduce any error, but still, the legitimate users of the system cannot distil a secure key. A notable feature of the proposed protocol is that it promotes greater robustness against both attacks than the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol or the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol.</p>","PeriodicalId":100651,"journal":{"name":"IET Quantum Communication","volume":"5 3","pages":"282-290"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1049/qtc2.12089","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IET Quantum Communication","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1049/qtc2.12089","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"QUANTUM SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security by leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics. This means the security is independent of all future advances in algorithm or computational power. However, due to the non-availability of single-photon sources, most traditional QKD protocols are vulnerable to various attacks, such as photon number-splitting (PNS) attacks. Also, the imperfections in the measuring devices open a loophole for side channels that an eavesdropper may exploit to launch attacks such as large-pulse attacks. As a result, this compromises the security of transmitted information. To address these challenges, the authors present a QKD protocol that is secure against both large-pulse attacks and PNS attacks at zero-error, in which the eavesdropper does not introduce any error, but still, the legitimate users of the system cannot distil a secure key. A notable feature of the proposed protocol is that it promotes greater robustness against both attacks than the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol or the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol.