{"title":"Innovation against change","authors":"Andrew P McLean","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnae002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There is presently an increased enthusiasm for competition law enforcement around the world, driven primarily by concerns about the power of digital platform companies. Against this background, this article identifies the emergence of a ‘techno-conservatism’ that invokes a ‘rhetoric of innovation’ to stymy the field’s ongoing shift towards a more interventionist paradigm. Drawing parallels between techno-conservatism and twentieth-century Chicago school conservatism, the article holds that appeals to innovation are a means of deterring enforcement against dominant companies in dynamic markets. This article contests the rhetoric of innovation, maintaining that it is possible to reconcile strong enforcement with care for innovation. It does so by raising three points. First, innovation often arises from smaller companies and deconcentrated markets. Secondly, many of the innovations associated with technology companies often have their origins in the public sector. Thirdly, innovation is not innately beneficial. It is not enough to defend dominance simply by pointing to ‘more innovation’; thought must also be given to the qualitative nature of that innovation. Taken together, these three ideas represent a useful framework with which to counter the rhetoric of innovation and defend the momentum building in competition law.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnae002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
There is presently an increased enthusiasm for competition law enforcement around the world, driven primarily by concerns about the power of digital platform companies. Against this background, this article identifies the emergence of a ‘techno-conservatism’ that invokes a ‘rhetoric of innovation’ to stymy the field’s ongoing shift towards a more interventionist paradigm. Drawing parallels between techno-conservatism and twentieth-century Chicago school conservatism, the article holds that appeals to innovation are a means of deterring enforcement against dominant companies in dynamic markets. This article contests the rhetoric of innovation, maintaining that it is possible to reconcile strong enforcement with care for innovation. It does so by raising three points. First, innovation often arises from smaller companies and deconcentrated markets. Secondly, many of the innovations associated with technology companies often have their origins in the public sector. Thirdly, innovation is not innately beneficial. It is not enough to defend dominance simply by pointing to ‘more innovation’; thought must also be given to the qualitative nature of that innovation. Taken together, these three ideas represent a useful framework with which to counter the rhetoric of innovation and defend the momentum building in competition law.
期刊介绍:
The journal covers a wide range of enforcement related topics, including: public and private competition law enforcement, cooperation between competition agencies, the promotion of worldwide competition law enforcement, optimal design of enforcement policies, performance measurement, empirical analysis of enforcement policies, combination of functions in the competition agency mandate, and competition agency governance. Other topics include the role of the judiciary in competition enforcement, leniency, cartel prosecution, effective merger enforcement, competition enforcement and human rights, and the regulation of sectors.