Effort complementarity and role assignments in group contests

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-02-21 DOI:10.1111/jems.12580
Katsuya Kobayashi
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Abstract

This study characterizes role assignments in maximizing a group's winning probability under the influence of the complementarity of group members' efforts in a group contest, in contrast to prize and multiple resource allocations. We use a constant elasticity of substitution effort aggregator function to parameterize the complementarity. While the prize and resource allocation rules depend on the complementarity, the assignment rule does not when multiple roles are assignable to a single group member: All roles are assigned only to the most productive group member. However, when only a single role per group member is assignable, the assignment rule depends on the complementarity: Roles from greater to less importance are assigned to group members in descending order of their productivity under strong complementarity; only the most important role is assigned to the most productive group member and the others have no effect under weak complementarity.

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小组竞赛中的努力互补和角色分配
与奖品分配和多重资源分配不同,本研究描述了在小组竞赛中小组成员努力互补的影响下,为最大化小组获胜概率而进行的角色分配。我们使用恒定替代弹性的努力聚合函数来确定互补性的参数。虽然奖金和资源分配规则取决于互补性,但当多个角色可分配给一个小组成员时,分配规则则不取决于互补性:所有角色只分配给生产力最高的小组成员。然而,当每个小组成员只能分配一个角色时,分配规则就取决于互补性:在强互补性条件下,从重要到不重要的角色按生产率从高到低的顺序分配给小组成员;在弱互补性条件下,只有最重要的角色才分配给生产率最高的小组成员,其他角色没有任何影响。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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