Does artificial intelligence exhibit basic fundamental subjectivity? A neurophilosophical argument

IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-26 DOI:10.1007/s11097-024-09971-0
Georg Northoff, Steven S. Gouveia
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Abstract

Does artificial intelligence (AI) exhibit consciousness or self? While this question is hotly debated, here we take a slightly different stance by focusing on those features that make possible both, namely a basic or fundamental subjectivity. Learning from humans and their brain, we first ask what we mean by subjectivity. Subjectivity is manifest in the perspectiveness and mineness of our experience which, ontologically, can be traced to a point of view. Adopting a non-reductive neurophilosophical strategy, we assume that the point of view exhibits two layers, a most basic neuroecological and higher order mental layer. The neuroecological layer of the point of view is mediated by the timescales of world and brain, as further evidenced by empirical data on our sense of self. Are there corresponding timescales shared with the world in AI and is there a point of view with perspectiveness and mineness? Discussing current neuroscientific evidence, we deny that current AI exhibits a point of view, let alone perspectiveness and mineness. We therefore conclude that, as per current state, AI does not exhibit a basic or fundamental subjectivity and henceforth no consciousness or self is possible in models such as ChatGPT and similar technologies.

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人工智能是否表现出基本的主观性?神经哲学论证
人工智能(AI)是否表现出意识或自我?虽然这个问题争论不休,但在这里我们将采取略有不同的立场,重点关注那些使两者成为可能的特征,即基本或根本的主观性。借鉴人类及其大脑的经验,我们首先要问什么是主观性。主体性体现在我们经验的持久性和敏锐性上,从本体论上讲,这可以追溯到一种观点。采用非还原的神经哲学策略,我们假定视点有两个层次,一个是最基本的神经生态层,另一个是更高阶的心理层。观点的神经生态层以世界和大脑的时间尺度为中介,我们的自我意识的经验数据进一步证明了这一点。在人工智能中,是否存在与世界共享的相应时间尺度,是否存在具有持久性和敏锐性的观点?通过讨论当前的神经科学证据,我们否认当前的人工智能表现出观点,更不用说持久性和敏锐性了。因此,我们的结论是,就目前的状况而言,人工智能并不表现出基本或根本的主体性,因此在 ChatGPT 等模型和类似技术中不可能存在意识或自我。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
8.70%
发文量
72
期刊介绍: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is an interdisciplinary, international journal that serves as a forum to explore the intersections between phenomenology, empirical science, and analytic philosophy of mind. The journal represents an attempt to build bridges between continental phenomenological approaches (in the tradition following Husserl) and disciplines that have not always been open to or aware of phenomenological contributions to understanding cognition and related topics. The journal welcomes contributions by phenomenologists, scientists, and philosophers who study cognition, broadly defined to include issues that are open to both phenomenological and empirical investigation, including perception, emotion, language, and so forth. In addition the journal welcomes discussions of methodological issues that involve the variety of approaches appropriate for addressing these problems.    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences also publishes critical review articles that address recent work in areas relevant to the connection between empirical results in experimental science and first-person perspective.Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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