From performance to horizon: managements’ horizon and firms’ investment efficiency

IF 3.6 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Review of Accounting and Finance Pub Date : 2024-03-01 DOI:10.1108/raf-11-2022-0319
Abongeh A. Tunyi, Geofry Areneke, Tanveer Hussain, Jacob Agyemang
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Abstract

Purpose

This study proposes a novel measure for management’s horizon (short-termism or myopia vs long-termism or hyperopia) derived from easily obtainable firm-level accounting and stock market performance data. The authors use the measure to explore the impact of managements’ horizon on firms’ investment efficiency.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors rely on two commonly used but uncorrelated measures of management performance: accounting performance (return on capital employed, ROCE) and stock market performance (average abnormal return, AAR). The authors combine these measures to develop a multidimensional framework for performance, which classifies firms into four groups: efficient (high accounting and high market performance), poor (low accounting and low market performance), myopic (high accounting and low market performance) and hyperopic (low accounting and high market performance). The authors validate this framework and deploy it to explore the relationship between horizon and firms’ investment efficiency.

Findings

In validation tests, the authors show that management myopia (hyperopia) explains firms’ decision to cut (grow) research and development investments. Further, as expected, myopic (hyperopic) firms are associated with significantly more (less) accrual and real earnings management. The empirical tests on the link between horizon and investment efficiency suggest that myopic managers cut new investments while their hyperopic counterparts grow the same. Ultimately, the authors find that myopia (hyperopia) exacerbates(mitigates) the over-investment of free cash flow problem.

Originality/value

The authors introduce a framework for assessing management’s horizon using easily obtainable measures of performance. The framework explains inconsistencies in prior empirical research using different measures of performance (accounting versus market). The authors demonstrate its utility by showing that the measure explains decisions around research and development investment, earnings management and firm investments.

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从业绩到视野:管理层的视野与公司的投资效率
目的本研究提出了一种新的衡量管理层视野的方法(短期主义或近视与长期主义或远视),该方法源自易于获取的公司级会计和股票市场绩效数据。设计/方法/途径 作者利用两种常用但不相关的管理绩效衡量方法:会计绩效(资本回报率,ROCE)和股票市场绩效(平均异常回报率,AAR)。作者将这些指标结合起来,建立了一个多维绩效框架,将企业分为四类:高效(高会计绩效和高市场绩效)、低效(低会计绩效和低市场绩效)、近视(高会计绩效和低市场绩效)和远视(低会计绩效和高市场绩效)。作者对这一框架进行了验证,并将其用于探索视野与企业投资效率之间的关系。研究结果在验证测试中,作者发现管理层近视(远视)可以解释企业削减(增加)研发投资的决策。此外,正如预期的那样,近视(远视)企业与显著增加(减少)权责发生制和实际收益管理有关。对眼界与投资效率之间联系的实证检验表明,近视的管理者会削减新投资,而远视的管理者则会增加新投资。作者最终发现,近视(远视)会加剧(缓解)自由现金流过度投资的问题。该框架解释了之前使用不同业绩衡量标准(会计与市场)的实证研究中存在的不一致之处。作者通过证明该衡量标准可以解释研发投资、收益管理和公司投资方面的决策,从而证明了该框架的实用性。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
18
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