Due Diligence

IF 7.6 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-03-04 DOI:10.1111/jofi.13322
BRENDAN DALEY, THOMAS GEELEN, BRETT GREEN
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Abstract

We propose a model of due diligence and analyze its effect on prices, payoffs, and deal completion. In our model, if the seller accepts an offer, the winning bidder (or “acquirer”) can gather information and chooses when to complete the transaction. In equilibrium, the acquirer engages in “too much” due diligence. Our quantitative results suggest that the magnitude of the distortion is economically significant. Nevertheless, allowing for due diligence can improve both total surplus and the seller's payoff compared to a setting without due diligence. We use our framework to explore the timing of due diligence, bidder heterogeneity, and breakup fees.

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尽职调查
我们提出了一个尽职调查模型,并分析了它对价格、回报和交易完成的影响。在我们的模型中,如果卖方接受要约,中标者(或 "收购方")可以收集信息并选择何时完成交易。在均衡状态下,收购方会进行 "过多 "的尽职调查。我们的定量结果表明,扭曲的程度在经济上是显著的。尽管如此,与没有尽职调查的情况相比,允许尽职调查可以提高总盈余和卖方收益。我们利用我们的框架探讨了尽职调查的时机、投标人异质性和分手费。
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来源期刊
Journal of Finance
Journal of Finance Multiple-
CiteScore
12.90
自引率
2.50%
发文量
88
期刊介绍: The Journal of Finance is a renowned publication that disseminates cutting-edge research across all major fields of financial inquiry. Widely regarded as the most cited academic journal in finance, each issue reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, government entities, and financial institutions worldwide. Published bi-monthly, the journal serves as the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization dedicated to advancing knowledge and understanding in financial economics. Join us in exploring the forefront of financial research and scholarship.
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