Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians?

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-03-08 DOI:10.1007/s00355-024-01509-2

引用次数: 0

Abstract

In this paper, we challenge the claim that a conservative central bank strengthens the likelihood of a conservative government. In contrast, if an election is based on the comparative advantages of the candidates, an inflation-averse central banker can deter the chances of a conservative candidate because once inflation is removed, its comparative advantage in the fight against inflation disappears. We develop a theory based on a policy-mix game with electoral competition, predicting that a tighter monetary policy reduces the chances of a conservative (i.e., inflation-adverse) party while enhancing the chances for a liberal party. To test these predictions, we examine monthly data of British political history between 1987 and 2015, and show that an increase in the interest rate in the 10 months preceding a national election decreases the popularity of a Tory government. Our analysis on a panel of six OECD countries reveals that a pre-election increase of 1 percentage point in the main targeted interest rate rises the popularity of liberal parties by around 3.43 percentage points relative to its trend.

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保守派中央银行家是否会削弱保守派政治家的机会？

摘要在本文中，我们对保守派中央银行会增强保守派政府可能性的说法提出质疑。相反，如果选举是基于候选人的比较优势，那么厌恶通胀的中央银行就会阻碍保守派候选人的机会，因为一旦消除了通胀，其在对抗通胀方面的比较优势就会消失。我们提出了一个基于选举竞争的政策组合博弈理论，预测紧缩货币政策会减少保守党（即厌恶通胀的政党）的机会，同时增加自由党的机会。为了验证这些预测，我们研究了 1987 年至 2015 年英国政治历史的月度数据，结果表明，在全国大选前 10 个月内提高利率会降低保守党政府的受欢迎程度。我们对经合组织（OECD）6 个国家的面板分析表明，主要目标利率在大选前上升 1 个百分点，自由党的支持率就会相对于趋势上升约 3.43 个百分点。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Social Choice and Welfare Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf

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