Sidgwick and Bentham's “double aspect” of utilitarianism revisited

Abstract

In “Sidgwick on Bentham: the ‘Double Aspect’ of Utilitarianism”, Schofield argued that Bentham did not regard his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that natural benevolence is at his disposal to mitigate the problem of the “double aspect” of utilitarianism. This paper argues that Bentham regarded his psychological theory as part of his utilitarianism and that, in a manner quite distinct from an internal, benevolence approach, he took advantage of self-preference and thus adopted a self-preference and artificial means-based approach, thereby still maintaining an internal approach supported by external, institutional contrivance. In so doing, he argued first that self-preference could add to the greatest happiness; second, that benevolence would tend to facilitate the achievement of the greatest happiness, with the consequence that he endorsed the artificial cultivation of benevolence; and third, that the artificial means of the junction-of-interests-prescribing principle should be adopted to bridge the gap between self-preference and the greatest happiness. Sidgwick failed to appreciate the depth and sophistication of Bentham's logic.