Assessment of profit rationing and boundaries of mining rent I and II as an economic method for regulating a mining project

Abstract

Based on the study of empirical economic data obtained during operation of a large-scale gold ore deposit, a model was built to justify the hypothesis about profit rationing, the formation and division of the differential rent I and II. The model identifies the increase in the equity premium as the sum of profit and rent II for investment capital and rent I for the owner of the resources. Boundaries of the capital movement are highlighted for the terms of service agreements with and without risk. The obtained values are attractive for the investment and/or operating side, and the resource owner during the field development. The approach based on profit rationing, assessment and division of the mining rent by types: (1) will help to introduce civil law relations in subsoil use based on service contracts with or without risk; (2) takes into account the value of reserves and resources in their mining and dividing them into ownerships, resources and investment capital; (3) introduces a new approach to attractiveness of deposit mining, both in attracting investment capital and for the operating companies based on a risk-free contract with retention of the ownership of resources with the country of the resource owner; (4) enhances the investment and production attractiveness of deposit mining providing incentives to introduce innovation technologies and improve the efficiency. It is possible to create an economic method for managing and regulating the mining industry of the Kyrgyz Republic based on the proposed approach.