Soft Governance Across Digital Platforms Using Transparency

IF 2.9 Q2 MANAGEMENT Strategy Science Pub Date : 2024-03-13 DOI:10.1287/stsc.2023.0006
Anil R. Doshi, William Schmidt
{"title":"Soft Governance Across Digital Platforms Using Transparency","authors":"Anil R. Doshi, William Schmidt","doi":"10.1287/stsc.2023.0006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Platform governance helps align the activities of participating actors to deliver value within the platforms. These platforms can operate in environments where governance is intentionally or conventionally weak in favor of open access, frictionless transactions, or free speech. Such low- or no-governance environments leave room for illegitimate actors to penetrate platforms with illegitimate content or transactions. We propose that an external observer can employ transparency mechanisms to establish “soft” governance that allows participants in a low-governance environment to distinguish between sources of legitimate and illegitimate content. We examine how this might work in the context of disinformation Internet domains by training a machine learning classifier to discern between low-legitimacy from high-legitimacy content providers based on website registration data. The results suggest that an independent observer can employ such a classifier to provide an early, although imperfect, signal of whether a website is intended to host illegitimate content. We show that the independent observer can be effective at serving multiple platforms by providing intermediate prediction results that platforms can align with their unique governance priorities. We expand our analysis with a signaling game model to ascertain whether such a soft governance structure can be resilient to adversarial responses. Funding: Funding for this research was provided by UCL School of Management and Emory University. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2023.0006 .","PeriodicalId":45295,"journal":{"name":"Strategy Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Strategy Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2023.0006","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Platform governance helps align the activities of participating actors to deliver value within the platforms. These platforms can operate in environments where governance is intentionally or conventionally weak in favor of open access, frictionless transactions, or free speech. Such low- or no-governance environments leave room for illegitimate actors to penetrate platforms with illegitimate content or transactions. We propose that an external observer can employ transparency mechanisms to establish “soft” governance that allows participants in a low-governance environment to distinguish between sources of legitimate and illegitimate content. We examine how this might work in the context of disinformation Internet domains by training a machine learning classifier to discern between low-legitimacy from high-legitimacy content providers based on website registration data. The results suggest that an independent observer can employ such a classifier to provide an early, although imperfect, signal of whether a website is intended to host illegitimate content. We show that the independent observer can be effective at serving multiple platforms by providing intermediate prediction results that platforms can align with their unique governance priorities. We expand our analysis with a signaling game model to ascertain whether such a soft governance structure can be resilient to adversarial responses. Funding: Funding for this research was provided by UCL School of Management and Emory University. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2023.0006 .
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
利用透明度实现跨数字平台的软治理
平台治理有助于调整参与方的活动,在平台内实现价值。这些平台可以在有意或习惯性弱治理的环境下运行,以支持开放访问、无摩擦交易或言论自由。这种低治理或无治理的环境为非法行为者提供了渗透平台的空间,使其可以进行非法内容或交易。我们建议,外部观察者可以利用透明机制建立 "软 "治理,让低治理环境中的参与者能够区分合法与非法内容的来源。我们通过训练一个机器学习分类器,根据网站注册数据来区分低合法性和高合法性内容提供商,从而研究这在虚假信息互联网域名的背景下如何发挥作用。结果表明,独立观察者可以利用这种分类器提供一个早期信号(尽管并不完美),表明一个网站是否打算托管非法内容。我们的研究表明,独立观察者可以通过提供中间预测结果,有效地为多个平台提供服务,而平台则可以根据自己独特的治理重点进行调整。我们通过信号博弈模型来扩展我们的分析,以确定这种软治理结构是否能抵御对抗性反应。资助:本研究由伦敦大学洛杉矶分校管理学院和埃默里大学资助。补充材料:在线附录见 https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2023.0006 。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
Strategy Science
Strategy Science MANAGEMENT-
CiteScore
6.30
自引率
5.10%
发文量
31
期刊最新文献
Airline Responses to the COVID-19 Collapse: Applying Learning to an Unprecedented Crisis Innovation Disclosures and the Design of Technology Acquisition Contracts: Evidence from the American Inventors Protection Act How Demand Shocks “Jumpstart” Technological Ecosystems and Commercialization: Evidence from the Global Electric Vehicle Industry How Firms Cultivate Collaboration During Postmerger Integration of Technology Acquisitions Who Captures the Value from Organizational Ratings?: Evidence from Public Schools
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1