Moral considerability of brain organoids from the perspective of computational architecture

Abstract

Human brain organoids equipped with complex cytoarchitecture and closed-loop feedback from virtual environments could provide insights into neural mechanisms underlying cognition. Yet organoids with certain cognitive capacities might also merit moral consideration. A precautionary approach has been proposed to address these ethical concerns by focusing on the epistemological question of whether organoids possess neural structures for morally-relevant capacities that bear resemblance to those found in human brains. Critics challenge this similarity approach on philosophical, scientific, and practical grounds but do so without a suitable alternative. Here, I introduce an architectural approach that infers the potential for cognitive-like processing in brain organoids based on the pattern of information flow through the system. The kind of computational architecture acquired by an organoid then informs the kind of cognitive capacities that could, theoretically, be supported and empirically investigated. The implications of this approach for the moral considerability of brain organoids are discussed.