Bureaucratic Autonomy and the Performance of International Institutions

Abstract

Despite longstanding scholarly interest in international institutions, remarkably little research has been conducted in variation in performance across organizations. In this essay, I review Ranjit Lall's book, which aims to fill that gap. Lall argues that the chief impediment to high-functioning international organizations (IOs) are member-states with particularistic interests that attempt to capture the institutions. The solution, he maintains, is to bolster the de facto autonomy of the bureaucrats who staff these institutions by forging operational alliances with nonstate stakeholders and mandating that they perform functions that are difficult for members to monitor. I evaluate Lall's argument and evidence. I then discuss a set of additional issues that are related to the performance of international institutions. First, why do stakeholders often continue to support those organizations that perform poorly? Second, what mechanisms exist for improving the performance of ailing IOs? Third, how does the widely documented backlash against globalization that has transpired during the past few decades bear on IOs? Fourth, Lall and others tout the benefits of well-performing IOs, but such institutions, nonetheless, can have costly and unanticipated side effects that merit greater scrutiny. Finally, formal international institutions have been key features of world politics. However, additional research is needed on whether and, if so, why they have become less important aspects of global governance.