{"title":"The Principal Principle and the contingent a priori","authors":"Richard Bradley","doi":"10.1017/s0266267124000014","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In Chapter 6 of <span>Objects of Credence</span>, Anna Mahtani argues that the opacity of credence raises difficulties for the Principal Principle and proposes a revised principle relating credence and chance that avoids it. In this comment on her book, I both defend Mahtani’s proposed principle against a charge of triviality and argue that the opacity of belief does not threaten the role of chance in guiding credence.</p>","PeriodicalId":501336,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Philosophy","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics & Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267124000014","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In Chapter 6 of Objects of Credence, Anna Mahtani argues that the opacity of credence raises difficulties for the Principal Principle and proposes a revised principle relating credence and chance that avoids it. In this comment on her book, I both defend Mahtani’s proposed principle against a charge of triviality and argue that the opacity of belief does not threaten the role of chance in guiding credence.