Are fishers captive labourers in reservoir fisheries? Examining governance models and economics in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, India

Abstract

Inland fisheries are a source of fish as well as livelihoods for as many as 82% of the total 28 million engaged in the Indian fisheries sector. Reservoir fisheries are a significant component but remain largely untapped, both as a potential resource for development as well as a site of academic interest. The importance of institutional arrangements in governing natural resources is fairly recognized. However, empirical examination of how governance regimes interact with and impact the economic benefits from natural resource extraction for its principal actors is less explored, at least in the Indian context. Through case studies of two uniquely located and differently governed fisheries of Gandhi Sagar (GS, Madhya Pradesh) and Rana Pratap Sagar (RPS, Rajasthan) reservoirs in the Chambal River valley, it investigates the (in)equity in benefit sharing among labour (fishers), capital (fishing contractor), and the management (custodian-state). Neither a purely revenue model of reservoir fisheries governance in RPS nor a seemingly revenue cum welfare model in GS has enhanced the income of nearly 2590 small-scale fishers above their subsistence levels, though the latter provides welfare benefits to its 2209 dependent fishers through cooperatives. Of the gross annual income of INR 13,874/ha in GS and INR 16,126/ha in RPS, the fishers have only one-third share in both cases, while the fishing contractors have 22% (GS) and 34% (RPS), and the resource managers have 29% (GS) and 15% (RPS) share, with the remaining 15% (GS) and 18% (RPS) accounted for by other costs, making the benefit sharing arrangement inequitable for fishers. Two key reforms, immediate market-linked upward revision of sale-price at which fish caught by fishers are collected by the contractors (from INR 33/kg to INR 65/kg), and long-term organization of fisher cooperatives as empowered collectives able to exercise their agency and co-manage the resource, are essential to ensure the fishers do not become captive labourers.