Katharina Eickhoff, S. Thomas McCormick, Britta Peis, Niklas Rieken, Laura Vargas Koch
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
We consider a market where a set of objects is sold to a set of buyers, each equipped with a valuation function for the objects. The goal of the auctioneer is to determine reasonable prices together with a stable allocation. One definition of “reasonable” and “stable” is a Walrasian equilibrium, which is a tuple consisting of a price vector together with an allocation satisfying the following desirable properties: (i) the allocation is market-clearing in the sense that as much as possible is sold, and (ii) the allocation is stable in the sense that every buyer ends up with an optimal set with respect to the given prices. Moreover, “buyer-optimal” means that the prices are smallest possible among all Walrasian prices. In this paper, we present a combinatorial network flow algorithm to compute buyer-optimal Walrasian prices in a multi-unit matching market with truncated additive valuation functions. The algorithm can be seen as a generalization of the classical housing market auction and mimics the very natural procedure of an ascending auction. We use our structural insights to prove monotonicity of the buyer-optimal Walrasian prices with respect to changes in supply or demand.
期刊介绍:
Network problems are pervasive in our modern technological society, as witnessed by our reliance on physical networks that provide power, communication, and transportation. As well, a number of processes can be modeled using logical networks, as in the scheduling of interdependent tasks, the dating of archaeological artifacts, or the compilation of subroutines comprising a large computer program. Networks provide a common framework for posing and studying problems that often have wider applicability than their originating context.
The goal of this journal is to provide a central forum for the distribution of timely information about network problems, their design and mathematical analysis, as well as efficient algorithms for carrying out optimization on networks. The nonstandard modeling of diverse processes using networks and network concepts is also of interest. Consequently, the disciplines that are useful in studying networks are varied, including applied mathematics, operations research, computer science, discrete mathematics, and economics.
Networks publishes material on the analytic modeling of problems using networks, the mathematical analysis of network problems, the design of computationally efficient network algorithms, and innovative case studies of successful network applications. We do not typically publish works that fall in the realm of pure graph theory (without significant algorithmic and modeling contributions) or papers that deal with engineering aspects of network design. Since the audience for this journal is then necessarily broad, articles that impact multiple application areas or that creatively use new or existing methodologies are especially appropriate. We seek to publish original, well-written research papers that make a substantive contribution to the knowledge base. In addition, tutorial and survey articles are welcomed. All manuscripts are carefully refereed.