Hume's Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Physical Science by Matias Slavov (review)

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Hume Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-09 DOI:10.1353/hms.2024.a924234
Krisztián Pete
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ISBN 9781350087866, £95. <p>Although the relationship between Hume and Newton is a recurring theme in the Hume literature, Matias Slavov’s book does not seek to contribute to the debate between the traditional (Hume imitated Newton’s natural philosophy) and the critical (Hume intended his “science of Man” as the foundation of all other sciences) approaches regarding the nature of this relation. The book is intended to be a summary of Hume’s natural philosophy—or rather an aggregation of his comments on natural philosophical topics—pursued by exploring and analysing themes and issues that were prominent in the natural philosophy of the early modern period. In this respect it is a pioneering undertaking.</p> <p>Of course, Slavov does not claim in his book that Hume is a natural philosopher. “[F]irst and foremost . . . [h]e is not; for his main objective is to establish a new science of human nature” (1). But Slavov does claim that Hume’s natural philosophical views can be understood and valued in themselves and in the philosophical-scientific context of his time as well. The book is not a discussion of the natural philosophical dimensions of the “science of human nature,” but rather, of the natural philosophical views which are reconcilable with his main objective. In this respect, the book is not a methodological approach to Hume’s supposed natural philosophy, but a synthesis of certain elements of Hume’s philosophy that can feature in a consistent natural philosophy. Although his arguments are generally indirect and are more about what Hume seems to be committed to and what follows from his epistemological position rather than his actual positions, Slavov’s conclusions seem mostly convincing.</p> <p>Thus, Slavov’s point is not that the empiricist method is compatible in every detail with Newtonian mechanics, but rather that Hume seems to be committed more to a Cartesian natural philosophy. Slavov does not write about the possibility and significance of applying natural philosophical methods to moral philosophy; rather, he wants to build a complete philosophy of nature around some of Hume’s basic ideas to “fill the gap for a book on Hume’s relation to natural philosophy and philosophy of physical science” (2).</p> <p>The book has two “equally important aims” (ix): to shed more light onto Hume’s relationship to natural philosophy, and to demonstrate that physics and philosophy have overlapping domains. Hume was hardly concerned with physics, so Slavov’s strategy of defining natural philosophy as an overlap between physics and philosophy (chapter 1) does, to some extent, explain the lack of textual evidence in this area. The definition of natural philosophy chosen by Slavov is also intended to ensure <strong>[End Page 170]</strong> that these two goals are intertwined, since according to Slavov’s definition, natural philosophy is “a grey area between philosophy and physics” (12).</p> <p>Personally, I do not feel comfortable with this definition because it is not informative enough; it says that natural philosophy is more than modern physics (mathematized natural science), but it is not quite philosophy. While the first implication is very agreeable, and a number of scholars have addressed the issue, to assess the second implication, we would need to know exactly what philosophy is in this context. Perhaps the best candidate is metaphysics, even if Slavov keeps the reader somewhat in the dark on this point, despite the fact that chapter 2 is intended to establish precisely that point. Yet, the metaphysics of this period was usually (with the possible exception of Spinoza) used to support natural scientific explanations. I believe that natural philosophy is more than a “grey area” (9, 12, 22), or a contact zone; it is a complex enterprise that evolved in different forms with different emphases: Cartesian mechanics still sought to understand nature, pursuing the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge, albeit rejecting Aristotelian methods, while empiricists increasingly envisaged a more instrumentalist role for natural explanations. Newton himself was caught between the two.</p> <p>In this context it is intriguing whether Hume carries forward Berkeley...</p> </p>","PeriodicalId":29761,"journal":{"name":"Hume Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hume Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2024.a924234","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Reviewed by:

  • Hume’s Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Physical Science by Matias Slavov
  • Krisztián Pete
Matias Slavov. Hume’s Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Physical Science. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. Pp. 216. Hardcover. ISBN 9781350087866, £95.

Although the relationship between Hume and Newton is a recurring theme in the Hume literature, Matias Slavov’s book does not seek to contribute to the debate between the traditional (Hume imitated Newton’s natural philosophy) and the critical (Hume intended his “science of Man” as the foundation of all other sciences) approaches regarding the nature of this relation. The book is intended to be a summary of Hume’s natural philosophy—or rather an aggregation of his comments on natural philosophical topics—pursued by exploring and analysing themes and issues that were prominent in the natural philosophy of the early modern period. In this respect it is a pioneering undertaking.

Of course, Slavov does not claim in his book that Hume is a natural philosopher. “[F]irst and foremost . . . [h]e is not; for his main objective is to establish a new science of human nature” (1). But Slavov does claim that Hume’s natural philosophical views can be understood and valued in themselves and in the philosophical-scientific context of his time as well. The book is not a discussion of the natural philosophical dimensions of the “science of human nature,” but rather, of the natural philosophical views which are reconcilable with his main objective. In this respect, the book is not a methodological approach to Hume’s supposed natural philosophy, but a synthesis of certain elements of Hume’s philosophy that can feature in a consistent natural philosophy. Although his arguments are generally indirect and are more about what Hume seems to be committed to and what follows from his epistemological position rather than his actual positions, Slavov’s conclusions seem mostly convincing.

Thus, Slavov’s point is not that the empiricist method is compatible in every detail with Newtonian mechanics, but rather that Hume seems to be committed more to a Cartesian natural philosophy. Slavov does not write about the possibility and significance of applying natural philosophical methods to moral philosophy; rather, he wants to build a complete philosophy of nature around some of Hume’s basic ideas to “fill the gap for a book on Hume’s relation to natural philosophy and philosophy of physical science” (2).

The book has two “equally important aims” (ix): to shed more light onto Hume’s relationship to natural philosophy, and to demonstrate that physics and philosophy have overlapping domains. Hume was hardly concerned with physics, so Slavov’s strategy of defining natural philosophy as an overlap between physics and philosophy (chapter 1) does, to some extent, explain the lack of textual evidence in this area. The definition of natural philosophy chosen by Slavov is also intended to ensure [End Page 170] that these two goals are intertwined, since according to Slavov’s definition, natural philosophy is “a grey area between philosophy and physics” (12).

Personally, I do not feel comfortable with this definition because it is not informative enough; it says that natural philosophy is more than modern physics (mathematized natural science), but it is not quite philosophy. While the first implication is very agreeable, and a number of scholars have addressed the issue, to assess the second implication, we would need to know exactly what philosophy is in this context. Perhaps the best candidate is metaphysics, even if Slavov keeps the reader somewhat in the dark on this point, despite the fact that chapter 2 is intended to establish precisely that point. Yet, the metaphysics of this period was usually (with the possible exception of Spinoza) used to support natural scientific explanations. I believe that natural philosophy is more than a “grey area” (9, 12, 22), or a contact zone; it is a complex enterprise that evolved in different forms with different emphases: Cartesian mechanics still sought to understand nature, pursuing the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge, albeit rejecting Aristotelian methods, while empiricists increasingly envisaged a more instrumentalist role for natural explanations. Newton himself was caught between the two.

In this context it is intriguing whether Hume carries forward Berkeley...

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休谟的自然哲学和物理科学哲学》,马蒂亚斯-斯拉沃夫著(评论)
以下是内容的简要摘录,以代替摘要:评论者: 休谟的自然哲学和物理科学哲学》,作者:马蒂亚斯-斯拉沃夫-克里斯蒂安-皮特-马蒂亚斯-斯拉沃夫。休谟的自然哲学和物理科学哲学》。伦敦:布鲁姆斯伯里学术出版社,2020 年。第 216 页。精装。ISBN9781350087866,95英镑。尽管休谟与牛顿之间的关系是休谟文献中反复出现的主题,但马蒂亚斯-斯拉沃夫的这本书并不寻求对传统观点(休谟模仿牛顿的自然哲学)和批判观点(休谟打算将他的 "人的科学 "作为所有其他科学的基础)之间关于这种关系性质的争论做出贡献。本书旨在总结休谟的自然哲学,或者说是汇总他对自然哲学主题的评论,通过探讨和分析现代早期自然哲学中的突出主题和问题来实现这一目的。在这方面,这是一项开创性的工作。当然,斯拉沃夫并没有在书中宣称休谟是一位自然哲学家。"首先......他不是。[他不是;因为他的主要目标是建立一门关于人性的新科学"(1)。但斯拉沃夫确实声称,休谟的自然哲学观点本身以及他所处时代的哲学-科学背景都可以得到理解和评价。本书不是讨论 "人性科学 "的自然哲学层面,而是讨论与休谟的主要目标相一致的自然哲学观点。在这方面,本书不是从方法论的角度来探讨休谟所谓的自然哲学,而是综合了休谟哲学中的某些要素,这些要素可以成为一种前后一致的自然哲学的特征。虽然他的论证一般都比较间接,更多的是关于休谟似乎致力于什么以及从他的认识论立场得出什么,而不是他的实际立场,但斯拉沃夫的结论似乎大多令人信服。因此,斯拉沃夫的观点并不是经验主义方法在每个细节上都与牛顿力学兼容,而是休谟似乎更致力于笛卡尔自然哲学。斯拉沃夫并没有写将自然哲学方法应用于道德哲学的可能性和意义;相反,他希望围绕休谟的一些基本思想构建一个完整的自然哲学,以 "填补休谟与自然哲学和物理科学哲学关系一书的空白"(2)。该书有两个 "同样重要的目的"(ix):进一步揭示休谟与自然哲学的关系,以及证明物理学与哲学有重叠的领域。休谟几乎不关心物理学,因此斯拉沃夫将自然哲学定义为物理学与哲学的重叠(第1章),在一定程度上解释了这方面缺乏文本证据的原因。斯拉沃夫选择自然哲学的定义也是为了确保 [完170页] 这两个目标相互交织,因为根据斯拉沃夫的定义,自然哲学是 "哲学与物理学之间的灰色地带"(12)。就我个人而言,我对这个定义并不满意,因为它的信息量不够大;它说自然哲学比现代物理学(数学化的自然科学)更多,但又不完全是哲学。虽然第一种含义是非常令人赞同的,而且许多学者也讨论了这个问题,但要评估第二种含义,我们需要知道在这种情况下哲学到底是什么。也许形而上学是最佳候选,尽管斯拉沃夫在这一点上让读者有些不知所云,尽管第 2 章的目的正是要确定这一点。然而,这一时期的形而上学通常(斯宾诺莎可能是个例外)是用来支持自然科学解释的。我认为,自然哲学不仅仅是一个 "灰色地带"(9, 12, 22),也不仅仅是一个接触区;它是一项复杂的事业,以不同的形式、不同的侧重点演变而来:笛卡尔力学仍然试图理解自然,追求亚里士多德式的知识理想,尽管摒弃了亚里士多德式的方法;而经验主义者则越来越多地为自然解释设想了更多的工具主义角色。牛顿本人就处于两者之间。在这种情况下,休谟是否继承了伯克利的思想,这一点很耐人寻味。
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The Testimony of Sense: Empiricism and the Essay from Hume to Hazlitt by Tim Milnes (review) Hume as Regularity Theorist—After All! Completing a Counter-Revolution Hume on Self-Government and Strength of Mind Hume beyond Theism and Atheism Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment in Light of His Explanatory Project
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