{"title":"Byers v Saudi National Bank: What's the Wrong in Knowing Receipt?","authors":"Rory Gregson, Timothy Pilkington","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12888","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In <jats:italic>Byers</jats:italic> v <jats:italic>Saudi National Bank</jats:italic>, the Supreme Court held that where a right is transferred in breach of trust and the beneficiary's beneficial interest in the right is extinguished by the transfer, a personal claim for knowing receipt is not available against the recipient. Lord Briggs and Lord Burrows offered different reasons for this conclusion. This note argues that their approaches, while superficially similar, could lead to divergent results in future cases. It argues that Lord Briggs’ analysis is to be preferred, and is best understood to mean that a personal claim for knowing receipt is one for breach of a restorative duty or a custodial duty. Whilst Lord Briggs did not offer a justification for these duties, this note argues that these duties, and therefore the personal claim for knowing receipt, are justified by a third party knowingly depriving the beneficiary of the performance of their trustee's duties.","PeriodicalId":47530,"journal":{"name":"Modern Law Review","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Modern Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12888","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
In Byers v Saudi National Bank, the Supreme Court held that where a right is transferred in breach of trust and the beneficiary's beneficial interest in the right is extinguished by the transfer, a personal claim for knowing receipt is not available against the recipient. Lord Briggs and Lord Burrows offered different reasons for this conclusion. This note argues that their approaches, while superficially similar, could lead to divergent results in future cases. It argues that Lord Briggs’ analysis is to be preferred, and is best understood to mean that a personal claim for knowing receipt is one for breach of a restorative duty or a custodial duty. Whilst Lord Briggs did not offer a justification for these duties, this note argues that these duties, and therefore the personal claim for knowing receipt, are justified by a third party knowingly depriving the beneficiary of the performance of their trustee's duties.