Effect of risk and incentives on contracts: The case of farm operators in Iowa

IF 2.1 3区 经济学 Q2 AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & POLICY Agribusiness Pub Date : 2024-04-08 DOI:10.1002/agr.21936
Jun Yeong Lee
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Abstract

Longitudinal data on Iowa landowner–operator contracts are used to examine how the mean, variance, and skewness of expected farmland returns affected contract terms from 2008 to 2019. To control for unobserved operator risk preferences and ability as a fixed effect, the sample includes operators with multiple contracts. Our empirical work shows that farmland with lower variance is more likely to be rented for cash, whereas land with highly variable returns is more likely to be custom contracted. [EconLit Citations: L14, Q15]
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风险和激励对合同的影响:爱荷华州农场经营者的案例
本文利用爱荷华州土地所有者与经营者合同的纵向数据,研究了 2008 年至 2019 年预期农田收益的均值、方差和偏度对合同条款的影响。为了控制未观察到的经营者风险偏好和能力作为固定效应,样本包括签订了多份合同的经营者。我们的实证工作表明,方差较小的农田更有可能以现金形式出租,而收益变化较大的土地更有可能以定制合同形式出租。[经济学引文:L14, Q15]
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来源期刊
Agribusiness
Agribusiness 农林科学-食品科技
CiteScore
5.50
自引率
6.20%
发文量
58
审稿时长
6 months
期刊介绍: Agribusiness: An International Journal publishes research that improves our understanding of how food systems work, how they are evolving, and how public and/or private actions affect the performance of the global agro-industrial complex. The journal focuses on the application of economic analysis to the organization and performance of firms and markets in industrial food systems. Subject matter areas include supply and demand analysis, industrial organization analysis, price and trade analysis, marketing, finance, and public policy analysis. International, cross-country comparative, and within-country studies are welcome. To facilitate research the journal’s Forum section, on an intermittent basis, offers commentary and reports on business policy issues.
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