Network effects on information acquisition by DeGroot updaters

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Economic Theory Pub Date : 2024-04-04 DOI:10.1007/s00199-024-01568-7

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Abstract

In today’s world, social networks have a significant impact on information processes, shaping individuals’ beliefs and influencing their decisions. This paper proposes a model to understand how boundedly rational (DeGroot) individuals behave when seeking information to make decisions in situations where both social communication and private learning take place. The model assumes that information is a local public good, and individuals must decide how much effort to invest in costly information sources to improve their knowledge of the state of the world. Depending on the network structure and agents’ positions, some individuals will invest in private learning, while others will free-ride on the social supply of information. The model shows that multiple equilibria can arise, and uniqueness is controlled by the lowest eigenvalue of a matrix determined by the network. The lowest eigenvalue roughly captures how two-sided a network is. Two-sided networks feature multiple equilibria. Under a utilitarian perspective, agents would be more informed than they are in equilibrium. Social welfare would be improved if influential agents increased their information acquisition levels.

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网络效应对 DeGroot 更新器获取信息的影响

摘要当今世界，社交网络对信息过程有着重大影响，它塑造着个人的信念并影响着他们的决策。本文提出了一个模型，以了解在社会交流和私人学习同时发生的情况下，有界理性（DeGroot）个体在寻求信息以做出决策时的行为方式。该模型假定信息是一种地方公共产品，个人必须决定在成本高昂的信息来源上投入多少精力，以提高他们对世界状况的了解。根据网络结构和代理人的立场，一些人会投资于私人学习，而另一些人则会搭社会信息供应的便车。该模型表明，可能会出现多重均衡，而唯一性由网络决定的矩阵的最低特征值控制。最低特征值大致反映了网络的双面性。双面网络具有多重均衡。从功利主义的角度来看，代理人的知情程度会高于均衡状态。如果有影响力的代理人提高信息获取水平，社会福利就会得到改善。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

23.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The purpose of Economic Theory is to provide an outlet for research - in all areas of economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning, and - on specific topics in mathematics which is motivated by the analysis of economic problems. Economic Theory''s scope encompasses - but is not limited to - the following fields. - classical and modern equilibrium theory - cooperative and non-cooperative game theory - macroeconomics - social choice and welfare - uncertainty and information, intertemporal economics (including dynamical systems) - public economics - international and developmental economics - financial economics, money and banking - industrial organization Economic Theory also publishes surveys if they clearly picture the basic ideas at work in some areas, the essential technical apparatus which is used and the central questions which remain open. The development of a productive dialectic between stylized facts and abstract formulations requires that economic relevance be at the forefront. Thus, correct, and innovative, mathematical analysis is not enough; it must be motivated by - and contribute to - the understanding of substantive economic problems. Officially cited as: Econ Theory

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