A family of condorcet domains that are single-peaked on a circle

IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-04-03 DOI:10.1007/s00355-024-01520-7
Arkadii Slinko
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Abstract

Fishburn’s alternating scheme domains occupy a special place in the theory of Condorcet domains. Karpov (2023) generalised these domains and made an interesting observation proving that all of them are single-peaked on a circle. However, an important point that all generalised Fishburn domains are maximal Condorcet domain remained unproved. We fill this gap and suggest a new combinatorial interpretation of generalised Fishburn’s domains which provide a constructive proof of single-peakedness of these domains on a circle. We show that classical single-peaked domains and single-dipped domains as well as Fishburn’s alternating scheme domains belong to this family of domains while single-crossing domains do not.

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在圆上呈单峰状的兀坐域族
菲什伯恩的交替方案域在孔多塞域理论中占有特殊地位。卡尔波夫(2023)对这些域进行了广义化,并提出了一个有趣的观点,证明所有这些域都是圆上的单峰。然而,关于所有广义菲什伯恩域都是最大康德赛特域这一重要观点仍未得到证明。我们填补了这一空白,提出了广义菲什伯恩域的新组合解释,为这些域在圆上的单峰性提供了构造性证明。我们证明了经典的单峰域和单垂域以及费什伯恩交替方案域都属于这个域族,而单交叉域则不属于这个域族。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
11.10%
发文量
56
期刊介绍: Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf
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