How to promote the sustainability of China's rural waste management system: Increase government subsidies or increase waste service management fees?

Abstract

Rural waste management is a highly complex issue requiring multi‐stakeholders' cooperation. The promotion of cooperative action through social mobilization is essential. Based on evolutionary game theory, this study constructs a dynamic model consisting of government, social funds, and rural residents to study the effectiveness of public–private partnership (PPP) projects in rural waste management in China. The results show that excessively high or low subsidies from the government to social funds are detrimental to the sustainability of rural waste management. The optimal subsidy rate ranges from 600,000 RMB to PPP 750,000 RMB. It may strike a balance between avoiding excessive financial burden on the government and encouraging a 5% increase in social funds' investment. Waste management fees are suitable for promoting the quality of rural waste management services, with the maximum ideal fee being 24 RMB. The simulation results also demonstrate that the policy combination of high incentives and high penalties and low supervision and high penalties is conducive to tripartite cooperation in PPP projects. In addition, the government should impose fines of more than 750,000 RMB on social funds to prevent potentially ineffective management services offered by the social funds.